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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF REMEDIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGALITY AND
THE LAW OF TORTS IN
BELL v. HOOD *
AL KATz t
The rights of individuals and the justice due to them, are
as dear and precious as those of States. Indeed, the latter are
founded upon the former; and the great end and object of
them must be to secure and support the rights of individuals,
or else vain is Government.
Justice Cushing in Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 468 (1793).
I. BELL V. HOOD ON REMAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT
In 1945, Arthur L. Bell and others, as individuals and on behalf
of an organization called "Mankind United," instituted litigation in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
The plaintiffs claimed they had been unlawfully detained and subjected
to unreasonable searches and seizures by members of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Bell and the others prayed recovery in dam-
ages for these alleged violations of the fourth and fifth amendments to
the United States Constitution.
The district court dismissed the action for want of a federal ques-
tion. The court of appeals affirmed.' On certiorari the Supreme Court
* I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Paul Bator for his inspiring
introduction to these problems.
t B.S. 1963, Temple University. J.D. 1966, LL.M. 1967, University of California,
Berkeley. Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation.
IBell v. Hood, 150 F2d 96 (9th Cir. 1945).
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reversed,2 holding that the complaint stated a claim which would arise
under "the Constitution or laws of the United States" * for the purposes
of jurisdiction, but expressed no opinion whether it stated a cause of
action as pleaded.
On remand, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.4 The court reasoned as
follows:
If the action was against federal officers as agents, it was essen-
tially an action against the government to which the United States had
not consented but had expressly barred by the Tort Claims Act.5
If the officers had acted unconstitutionally, and consequently out-
side the scope of their authority, they lost their governmental immunity.
Therefore, since the Bill of Rights only protects against governmental
action, the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under federal law.'
Furthermore, even if the action could be said to arise under federal
law, federal law provided no relief. Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,'
there is no federal common law. Any right of action available in fed-
eral court must be given either by the Constitution or by federal statute,
and neither granted a right to recover here.8 While the plaintiff might
have had a cause' of action in common law tort tnder state law, the
action could not be maintained in the district court since it did not arise
under the laws of the United States.'
The existence of a federal equity power to enjoin federal officials
threatening unconstitutional action would not support an action for
damages because the equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts
by the Constitution created only a duty to apply the equitable rules and
principles recognized by the English Chancery at the time of the Con-
stitution and not a power to exercise broad discretion at law.Y0 And
finally, the mere availability of equitable relief supported the nonexist-
ence of a legal remedy to redress violations of fourth and fifth amend-
ment rights, under the well-established principle that an injunction
will issue only if there, is no adequate remedy at law."
2327 U.S. 678 (1946).
3 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
471 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
5 Id. at 817 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 921, 931, 943 (1946)).
6Id.
7304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 71 F. Supp. at 817.
9Id.
10 Id. at 818-19.
11Id. at 819. At that time the principle was codified, 28 U.S.C. § 384 (1940).
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A. The Critical Thesis
I hope to show in this article that the district court in Bell v. Hood
reached the wrong result for the wrong reasons. Neither history nor
policy can be adduced to justify the result. There is nothing in the
historical development of remedial jurisprudence to suggest that reme-
dial law has not been fully applied to protect personal interests defined
in "political" documents like the Constitution. In fact, the history of
substantive legality is the history of the remedial system. Only when
these are treated together can the development of the norms of a legal
system become meaningful.
The continuing validity of the notion of the Constitution as law
requires full implementation of the remedial system available. But the
effect of the district court's decision in Bell v. Hood, if accepted,1 2 is to
cast substantial doubt on this notion of the Constitution as judicially
cognizable law.
Additional problems to be treated are raised by the nature of the
federal system. The particular difficulty of Bell v. Hood lies in the
interplay between state and federal substantive law, overlaid by the
interplay of state and federal remedial competence. Specifically, the
wrongs in Bell were both state torts and infringements of federally
protected rights. State and federal remedial systems must work in
concert to protect state and federal interests wronged by a single series
of actions.
But this does not mean, as the district court held, that the federal
remedy cannot exist. A federally created remedy in damages is pos-
sible under existing decisions; is sensible under existing circumstances;
and is necessary for the protection of essential liberties.
B. The Logic of the Opinion
The bodies of doctrine contained in the deceptively simple proposi-
tions offered up by the district court in Bell v. Hood combine to deny
relief to a plaintiff who has admittedly suffered a clear legal wrong.
According to the court, federal relief is available only when unconstitu-
tional activity is threatened-not when it has been accomplished.13
Under the allegations of the complaint, taken as true, the plaintiff has
12 Lower federal courts since that time have tended to accept the opinon as
dispositive, with neither question nor discussion. See, e.g., Johnston v. Earle, 245 F.2d
793, 796 (9th Cir. 1957) ("very able opinion"); Koch v. Zuieback, 316 F.2d 1, 2
(9th Cir. 1963) (citing Bell and Johnston).
The Supreme Court has, evidently, referred to Judge Mathes' "very able opinion"
in only one case. The references are not particularly flattering. Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 655 n.3, 657-58 n.6 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13 71 F. Supp. at 819.
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suffered the precise harm against which the Bill of Rights was designed
to protect.14  Those amendments, conceived as the cornerstone of
liberty against the excesses of government, are in such a situation
reduced to vacuous liturgy.
The compelling logic of the first and second points in the opinion
rests on the erroneous assumption that there is no such thing as "color"
of federal authority. As I shall demonstrate in part IV, actions against
federal officers as such reach back into the infancy of the Union. 5
While it is true these early actions were based on state tort law, it must
be remembered that the federal courts did not have general federal
question jurisdiction until 1875.16 Any suspicion that these cases were
not being brought against federal officers as "federal agents" is dispelled
by the number of cases in which state court proceedings were removed
to federal court on the ground that the federal officers were acting under
"color" of federal office." Indeed, as a conceptual matter, the consti-
tutionality of the congressional grant of removal jurisdiction as to
federal officers, where there is otherwise no federal question in the case,
must assume that providing a federal forum for the protection of those
persons carrying on the business of the federal government is justified.'8
It is highly incongruous to argue that the defendant is a federal officer
for purposes of jurisdiction but not for the purpose of stating a cause
of action.
It is quite true that when an officer is acting unconstitutionally he
is not acting within his federal authority and has therefore lost his sub-
stantive immunity from suit. 9 But it does not follow that he has lost
his character as a federal officer. He is still acting under "color" of
federal law."0 If the district court admits it has equitable power over
a federal officer preparing to act unconstitutionally,2' it must follow
that the court has power over him when he has so acted. The proposi-
tion that individuals are protected by the Bill of Rights only against
the prospective unconstitutional activity of federal agents is patently
absurd.
14 See pp. 33-39 infra.
15 See text accompanying notes 262-63 infra.
16 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
17 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 756; see F. FRANxFURTER & J. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREmE COURT 61 n.21 (1928).
Is Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
'9 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-20 (1912) ; Nationwide Charters
& Conventions, Inc. v. Garber, 254 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mass. 1966).
20 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 397, 398 (1914).
Compare the treatment of state officials exceeding their authority in Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961) (civil action for damages under federal statute) ;
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-11 (1945) (criminal prosecution) (majority
opinion on the point).
2 1 As it did admit. 71 F. Supp. at 818-19.
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Furthermore, to attempt to distinguish equity power from federal
jurisdiction at law is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the
constitutional grant.22  Congress has conferred jurisdiction on the fed-
eral courts in both law and equity since 1789. There is no reason to
believe that the constitutional grant of equitable power was any more
self-executing than the grant of jurisdiction at law.'3
The Tort Claims Act lends no support to the district court's con-
clusion that the agents were immune from suit. Section 931 (a) of the
1946 Act 2 4 provided for a waiver of immunity by the government in
certain cases. The language declared the United States to be liable
"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances . . . ." The Act is not dispositive of the
question whether the officer is liable, whether or not the action is against
the government. Congress can, of course, replace remedies against
federal officers by allowing suit against the government. 25 But so long
as it has not done so there is no reason to suppose that federal agents
do not remain subject to suit under traditional notions of personal
liability.
The district court held that in the absence of federal common law
the right of action must be given either by the Constitution or by
statute. The court, in other words, assumed that any remedy must be
set forth expressly in either of these bodies of positive law. If the court
was saying there was no power in the federal judiciary to fashion a
remedy enforcing a right created by an act of Congress where the act
did not specify the remedy by which it was to be enforced, it was
stating a proposition completely alien to the Erie doctrine and without
support in the structural reality of the federal system.26  Neither Erie
nor the nature of the federal courts as tribunals of limited jurisdiction
requires such a result.
Erie did nothing more than clarify the powers of the concurrent
jurisdictions in terms of the substantive interests of the states and the
Union. It cast no doubt on the power of federal courts, where the
issues in the case raise questions of federal law, to fashion interstitial
2 See Wechsler, Comment, in GOVERNmENT UNnnR LAw 134 (A. Sutherland ed.
1956).
23This is not the place to reopen the argument over the extent to which either of
the constitutional grants is self-executing, or the extent to which Congress can place
limitations on that jurisdiction. The point here is that there is, for our purposes, no
distinction between the two. See generally H. M. HART & H. WEcHsLER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 312-40 (1953).
2 4 Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 843, at 844, as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 2674 (1964).
25 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 722 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2 8 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also cases
cited note 174 infra.
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substantive rules 2 or exercise inherent remedial power within the area
of federal political concern.28 These problems will be discussed more
fully in part V, but it is worth noting here my belief that the district
court unfortunately confused the Erie problem with the allocation of
the law-making function between Congress and the federal judiciary. 9
A further problem with the district court's argument here is the
implicit decision that the Constitution, without more, does not create
duties enforceable at the instance of a party aggrieved. Such a position
is impossible to sustain in light of the admitted judicial power to
"void" unconstitutional legislation or enjoin threatened unconstitu-
tional activities. In addition, a passive view of constitutionally created
interests in liberty raises significant questions about the nature of the
document as law. I will deal with this question in part III.
Whether interests defined by federal law may be enforced in
federal courts where state law provides the rules of actionability is not
a simple question. It requires further elucidation of the meaning of
"arising under" in this context, and some useful method for dis-
tinguishing relative competence. I will deal with this in parts IV
and V.
The simplest but most troublesome argument advanced by the
district court is the support it finds for the denial of legal relief in the
availability of equitable remedies." As I will show in part IV, legal
relief has traditionally been viewed as the standard, effective method,
and the one which presents the least danger of interference with the
proper functioning of government. It is the purest casuistry to argue
the availability of an equitable remedy in support of the denial of a
remedy at law when equitable remedies exist and may be applied only
where the remedy at law is inadequate. Certainly the remedy at law
is inadequate where there is none, but that is the question for decision.
To assume that the historical existence of equitable relief must have
been premised on a decision against legal relief denies what the
Supreme Court admitted: that the question presented was one of
first instance."'
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the district court in Bell
found no difficulty in concluding the alleged conduct was wrongfulf
2
27 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957): "The range
of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem."
28 Justice Iredell's theoretical discussion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419, 434 (1793), is relevant in this regard. For a good discussion of these problems,
see Friendly, It Praise of Erie--and the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoRD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 64,92 (1964).
29 See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1955);
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
SI 71 F. Supp. at 819.
31 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
32 71 F. Supp. at 816.
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Insofar as federal jurisdiction was proper, the conduct could have been
wrongful only in the sense that it violated specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights. The simple issue is why there is no remedy in tort for
an act admittedly wrongful which causes harm to a well-defined
legal interest.
Due largely to the influence of legal realism on modern thinking,
most theorists would today agree that the mere existence of a wrongful
act which causes harm to another is not ground for an action in tort
to recover money damages.3 Sir Frederick Pollock claimed the
existence of a right of action wherever there is harm caused by another
without just cause or excuse. 4 The idea, an old one, can be traced
at least to the thirteenth-century ostensurus quare summons by which
the defendant was ordered to appear and show cause for having dam-
aged the plaintiff." Pollock's theory, rejected by the English courts
since 1895,6 would tell us more about tort theory if he had been less
ambiguous in his use of the terms "right" and "excuse."
If Pollock had been using "excuse" in the Wigmorian sense, per-
haps his claim would have been more meaningful. Wigmore dis-
tinguishes right, responsibility (cause) and excuse as elements of tort
adjudication." Here "right" becomes an interest which the law will
protect against harm provided the one responsible for the harm does
not have an "excuse." The claim of justification is hence a plea in
avoidance particular to this defendant and not a claim that plaintiff's
interest does not deserve protection. The latter claim is implicitly
rejected by denominating plaintiff's interest a "right." The failure to
see this distinction is apparent in cases like Mogul Steamship Co. v.
McGregor, Gow & Co. : while recognizing that acts which damage
the trade of another are actionable if done without just cause or excuse,
the court there went on to find just cause in the defendant's right to
carry on his trade freely and in any manner that best suited him. The
opinion would have been more rational had it merely said the plaintiff
had no interest which the law would protect from harm arising out
of commercial competition.
Bell v. Hood, however, is quite different. There, the district
court recognized an interest protected by the Constitution but whose
violation could not be redressed in damages. Part II of this article
33 W. PRoSsER, TORTS 4 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossER].
34 F. PoO.Oc, TORTS 17 (P. Landon ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as POLLOcK].
3 T. PLUCKNFET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 367 (5th ed. 1956)
[hereinafter cited as PLUCKNEV].
36 Pou.ocK 44 (editor's note).
37 Wigmore, The Tripartite Division of Torts, 8 HA.v. L. REv. 200 (1894).
38 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889).
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will detail the historical use of damages as a remedy for the violation
of ordinary legal interests as well as for the violation of what I shall
call interests in liberty: that is, interests which are defined or classified
by a political ethic. 9 The basis of the plaintiffs' claim in Bell was
that the conduct complained of was wrongful because it was specifically
condemned by the Bill of Rights. In part III I will examine the
function of that condemnation in terms of the concept of legality.
II. SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF HISTORY
In this part I will trace the historical relationship between con-
stitutional interests in liberty and the ordinary remedial legal system.
Admittedly, the use of history to prove the validity of a contemporary
theory or verbal construct is dangerous at best. I will not attempt to
state categorically the truth of historical propositions, but will merely
point to significant correlations between historical ideas and ways in
which the law has dealt with particular problems, noting that similar
propositions might very well have been so treated for dissimilar
reasons. 40  It is also admittedly difficult to base a legal argument on
the sense of justice in a people, to argue from a constructed or dis-
covered political ethic.41 Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the
existence of political ethics in the history of any culture. I therefore
feel quite justified in tracing historical connections between contempo-
rary and ancient ethical-legal relationships.
This part is divided into four sections. The first examines the
legal relationship between political ethics and legally identifiable in-
terests. The second relates those identifiable interests to the process
of remedial growth. The third discusses a particular instance of these
relationships; the interests identified will be those defined by legis-
lation, with remedial growth a function of the creation of civil remedies
to enforce those statutes. The last section deals with contemporary
policies of the federal courts regarding the creation of remedies based
upon legislatively identified interests.
39 The term "interest" is used in this paper to "denote the object of any human
desire." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 (1965). As in the Restatement, my
use of the term carries no implication that the object of desire is or is not deserving
of legal protection. Id., comment (a). See also Lever, Means, Motives and Interests
in the Law of Torts, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 50-56 (A. Guest ed. 1961).
Unless properly modified the term is purely descriptive. A legally protected interest,
however, refers to one that society has recognized as being so legitimate that it will
impose a sanction upon one who interferes with the realization of the desire that is the
subject of the interest
This use of "interest" is consistent with Professor Fried's distinction between
"want" and "interest" Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the
Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 756 n.2 (1963).40 See E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 22-23 (1948).
41 But cf. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process,
75 HARv. L. REy. 904, 922-23 (1962).
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A. Political Ethics ad Legal Interests
Debate on the "original understanding" of Magna Charta con-
tinues in the twentieth century much in the same way as debate on the
purposes and intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution.4 2 Without entering the debate, however, there are some
things which may be said about the nature of Magna Charta and its
importance.
It is now well accepted that in the thirteenth century Magna Charta
was a grant of rights to a limited class of beneficiaries rather than a
declaration of English liberties.48 Nevertheless, its importance as the
first instance of a written and binding "deal" between sovereign and
subject cannot be denied. In the centuries following it is this aspect
of the charter, along with significant "misinterpretations" of several
provisions, that becomes all important.44
For my purposes the most significant aspect of the charter is its
common law character. The feudal barons, at least, contended that
they were merely interested in securing and restoring rights which
existed before the reign of John and which were being presently abused
by him.45 Magna Charta was thus declarative and not creative. It was
part of the common law, rather than "special law," because it was de-
clarative and because it applied to all persons in all parts of the realm.4 6
Through "virtual representation" it was the product of common con-
sent,47 and was intended to exist in perpetuity.4  Magna Charta was
to have the force of fundamental law in statutory form.49 In other
words, it embodied all the distinctive aspects of early common law.
By the end of the thirteenth century any doubt about the common
law nature of the charter was removed by royal confirmation. Edward
I confirmed Magna Charta as part of the common law and directed that
pleas thereon be accepted in the courts of the realm.
Edward, by the Grace of God, King of England, Lord of
Ireland, Duke of Guian, to all those that these present letters
shall hear or see, Greeting. Know ye that we, to the Honor
4 2 See Radin, The Myth of Magna Charta, 60 HIKv. L. REv. 1060 (1947).
13 E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 30 (1929); Mcllwain, Magna Charta and Common Law, in MAGNA CHARTA
COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 171 (H. Malden ed. 1917) [hereinafter cited as COM0RA-
TION ESSAYS] ; McKechnie, Magna Charta, 1215-1915, in id. at 12, 17.
4 4
In my view every document of liberty has two aspects: a specific provisional
purpose and an historic ethical sense. This duality will be relevant at several points
in this paper.
45 COmMEMORATION ESSAYS 17, 170.
46Id. at 146, 155-56, 170-71, 175.
47 Id. at 175; cf. J. MARrrAin, MAN AND THE STATE 33, 35 (1954).
48 Co MmoRArIoN ESSAYS 146.
49 Id. at 172, 175.
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of God, and of the Holy Church, and to the Profit of our
Realm, have granted for us and our Heirs, that the Charter
of Liberties and the Charter of the Forest, which were made
by common Assent of all the Realm, in the Time of King
Henry our Father, shall be kept in every Point without
Breach. (2) And we will that the same Charters shall be
sent under our Seal, as well to our Justices of the Forest, as
to others, and to all Sheriffs of Shires, and to all our other
Officers, and to all our Cities throughout the Realm, together
with our Writs, in which it shall be contained, that they cause
the forsaid Charters to be published, and to declare to the
People that we have confirmed them in all Points; (3) And
that our Justices, Sheriffs, Mayors, and other Ministers,
which under us have the Laws of our Land to guide, shall
allow the said Charters pleaded before them in Judgment on
all Points, that is to wit, the Great Charter as the Common
Law, and the Charter of the Forest, for the Wealth of our
Realm.50
As a statute affirming the common law provisions of the charter it was
beyond the dispensing power of the crown.,"
The significance of the common law nature of Magna Charta
cannot be overstressed. It directly refutes the notion that laws that
place limits on governmental activity are somehow different from pri-
vate law. The apparent difference arises from the conceptual difficulty
in constructing norms that are to be binding upon the organs holding
the residuum of lawmaking power." But therein lies the fertility of
the common law. Norms arise as experience points to interests that
are worthy of legal protection. Particularly substantial interests in
liberty become interests protected by the common law. Magna Charta
may not have originally been a charter of liberties in the modern sense;
the nature of liberties must necessarily change as the common law re-
fines and redefines interests protectable by law. Put another way:
It seems safer, however, to maintain that there are two
Great Charters (or two aspects of the one charter) each of
which, valuable in its own sphere and period, has rendered in-
estimable services to the growth of sound theories of govern-
ment-the original feudal charter, and the charter of seven-
teenth century interpretations. Part, at least, of the greatness
of the Charter would seem to lie, not so much in what it was
5025 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1297). See also Dunham, Magna Charta and British Consti-
tutionalism, in THE GREAT CARTER 26, 30-31 (2d ed. 1966).
61 COMMEMORATION EssAys 152; A. DicEY, LAW OF THE CoNsrrruTioN 201 (10th
ed. 1959). See also pp. 33-44 infra.
452 J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE No. 6, § 292 (R. Campbell ed. 1875):
"[T]here can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends." See also Justice Holmes for the Court in Kawananakoa v. Poly-
bank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
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to its framers in 1215, as in what it afterwards became to the
political leaders, to the judges and lawyers, and to the entire
mass of the people of England in later ages. 3
The same process that transformed the political ethic of the barons
at Runnymede into legally protected interests operated to transform the
political ethics of eighteenth century Englishmen on the American con-
tinent into bills of rights. Apart from the differing structures of the
governments there is little to distinguish the processes. In neither case
were the specific contents of the interests fashioned out of air; " they
were derived from common concern with the libertarian interests
of citizens, and from the historical experience, both in England and in
the colonies, with the efforts of governments to abridge or ignore those
interests. The eighteenth century affirmations of interests in liberty
implicitly assert that those interests exist apart from the specific struc-
ture of government. The American Constitution changed the structure
of government in order to better protect those interests.55
Interests in liberty inhere in a people as a matter of heritage, cul-
ture and experience. Such of these interests as appear in major political
documents must be recognized as limitations on government because in
government resides the greatest potential of abuse.5" The American
Constitution transformed a political ethic into a recognized legal norm
in the manner of Magna Charta. This is clear from the two most vital
aspects of the opinion in Marbury v. Madison.5" To hold that the Con-
stitution applies in ordinary cases before ordinary courts, and that
legislation must be consistent with it, was not to express a new legal
doctrine. The statute of Edward I, reproduced above, expressed an
almost identical sentiment: Magna Charta was not to be breached in
any point, and its provisions could be pleaded in ordinary courts of
law.5 S That command was followed for centuries: the charter was so
treated as late as the colonial period. It was argued by William Penn
in his own defense, 9 by Andrew Hamilton for John Peter Zenger, 60
and by James Otis in Paxton's Case.6 '
63 COMMEMORATION EssAYs 12.
54 A. DIcEy, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 196 (10th ed. 1959).
65 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (U. Madison).
56 See, e.g., B. DEJoUVENEL, ON POWER; ITS NATURE AND THE HISTORY OF ITS
GROWTH 1-13 (1949) ; note 207 infra.
57 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
58 Cf. Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay. 252, 254 (S.C. 1792) ; 42 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1368).
69 6 How. St. Tr. 951 (1670).
'O 16 Am. St. Tr. 1 (1734).
63- 1 Quin. 51-57 (Mass. 1761). See generally Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213, 223 (1967) ; Huratado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1883) ; Hazeltine, The In-
fluence of Magna Charta on American Constitutional Developmeot, in COMMEMORATION
ESSAYS 180.
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Here is the convergence of political ethics and legal principles de-
rived from historical experience. The ethical interest in liberty becomes
infused in law, applicable and enforceable as such. The profound im-
plication of this proposition is that the administration of the common
law is coextensive with the administration of fundamentals of liberty.
The purpose in treating interests in liberty as part of the common law
is to assure their application in practice through protection by judicial
process. That purpose is frustrated when courts of law recognize their
existence as political ethic yet deny adequate remedy in their service.6"
B. Legal Interests and Remedial Growth
There is perhaps no area of the law that affords greater possi-
bility for confusion than the relationship between the changing content
of legally identifiable interests and the creation of an adequate remedial
system. Some clarification of this relationship may be drawn from an
examination of the development of interest and remedial creativity.
It would have made little sense for Edward I to have proclaimed
Magna Charta as the law of the land and directed that it be received
as pleaded in courts of the realm when he knew full well that the
existing writ system was largely inadequate for the purpose. No
writ could run against the king, as the author of all writs," nor against
the king's officials.65 But Edward had already met this problem by
inserting two provisions in the Statute of Westminster 11 (1285).
Chapter 13 gave persons wrongfully imprisoned a cause of action
against officials without regard to their official capacity:
(4) And if they do imprison other than such as have
been indicted by Inquest, the Parties imprisoned shall have
62 Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of main-
taining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the
law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitu-
tions. It would declare that an act which, according to the principles and
theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely
obligatory. It would declare that if the legislature shall do what is expressly
forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality
effectual. . . . It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may
be passed at pleasure.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
63L. EHRLICH, PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE CROWN (1216-1377), at 111 (Oxford
Studies in Social and Legal History No. 12, 1921).
64 H. BRACTON, DE LBxIBus Er CONSUETUDIxNIBus ANGLIAE, f.382b; EHRLICH,
supra note 63, at 26.
65 EHRLICH, supra note 63, at 111; Y.B. Pasch. 35 Edw. 1 (1307) (Rolls series,
at 466-70, A. Horwood ed. 1879). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558, 565 n.5
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). However, there is recent evidence that after Magna
Charta this was not necessarily true. See Turner, The Royal Courts Treat Disseizin
by the King: John and Henry HI, 1199-1240, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 1, 17 (1968).
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their Action by a Writ of Imprisonment against the Sheriffs,
as they should against any other person that should im-
prison them without Warrant.6
The last section of the statute, chapter 50, stated an even broader
principle:
(2) Moreover, concerning the statutes provided where
the Law faileth, and for Remedies, lest suitors coming to the
King's court should depart from thence without Remedy,
they shall have writs provided in their cases. . . .67
If chapter 50 had been taken in the middle ages to mean what
it seems to say when read from contemporary perspective, the entire
development of English law might have been quite different. But
there is no evidence that the section was ever used as authority for
remedial creativity. Scholarly writings on the development of trespass
on the case make no mention of chapter 50. The earliest case reference
that I have been able to find is in the latter half of the nineteenth
century.'8 Lord Coke merely noted that chapter 50 distinguished this
statute from those which gave a remedy to the king only.6 9
But Magna Charta was not left without teeth. Sentence of ex-
communication for violations was imposed in 1253, and on several
occasions in the fourteenth century the Commons petitioned for crim-
inal penalties against king's ministers who violated its provisions.
70
During the reign of Edward III we find the following enactments:
First, we have commanded all our Justices, That they shall
from henceforth do equal Law and execution of Right to all
our Subjects, Rich and Poor, without having regard to any
Person, and without omitting to do Right for any Letters
or Commandment which may come to them from us, or from
any other, or by any other Cause.
7
1
Item, That no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be,
shall be put out of his Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor im-
prisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought in answer by due Process of the Law (par due
proces de lei).'2
66 13 Edw. 1, c. 13, § 4 (1285).
6 Id. c. 50, §2.
6s Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q.B. 1854) (citing the Digests of
Comyns).
69 2 E. Coi:, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWEs OF ENGLAND 486 (1642) [hereinafter
cited as INSTITUTES]. But cf. Fricke, The Juridicial Nature of the Action on the
Statute, 76 L.Q. RF-v. 240 (1960); Linden, Tort Liability for Crimintl Nonfeasance,
44 CAN. BAR. REv. 25, 35-36 (1966).
70 COMMEMORATION ESSAYS 154, 177.
7'20 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1346).
72 28 Edw.-3, c. 3 (1354). Cf. Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1855).
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Chapter 10 of the same statute contains a rather extraordinary pro-
vision. To remedy the abuses of the officials of London, certain
criminal fines (payable to the king) were imposed. In addition to
the pains and penalties, it provided: "(4) . . . the Plaintiffs shall
recover the treble Damages against the Said Mayor, Sheriffs, and
Alderman." 73
This evidence, of course, is hardly proof of any extensive creation
of remedies to redress damage to interests defined by the Great
Charter. There is no clear proof that interests in liberty were fully
recognized as protectable during the period of the development of the
action on the case.74  Nevertheless, we are forced to the recognition
that myth is often of more contemporary import than scientific history.
Just as the myth of Magna Charta became, after Coke, more im-
portant than the fact of the charter,"5 the myth of remedial creativity
took on new life after the passage of centuries.
For the origins of the myth we must look elsewhere than to
Lord Coke. Chapter 24 of Westminster II "7 has received the greatest
scholarly attention," but Coke, in dealing with this chapter, merely
noted that under its provisions a petition for which no remedy existed
was to be referred to Parliament.'4 In the late seventeenth century it
was argued that chapter 24 provided a statutory basis for the action
on the case, and thus by definition allowed the creation of remedies to
redress violations of yet unactionable interests.79 Blackstone accepted
this view and pronounced the judgment that had the idea been accepted
in the fourteenth century the system of equity would not have been
necessary."0
Notwithstanding the lack of firm foundation in evidence from the
middle ages, it is not surprising to find post-seventeenth-century
rhetoric more compelling to subsequent generations. Comyns, for
example, states two relevant principles: that an action on the case does
not depend upon the existence of a writ but varies according to the
7 28 Edw. 3, c. 10, § 4 (1354).
74 See, e.g., Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J.
1142 (1936), which makes no mention of any such protection.
75 See Kurland, Magna Charta and Constitutionalism in the United States: "The
Noble Lie," in THE GREAT CHARTER 51 (2d ed. 1966).
76 13 Edw. 1, c. 24 (1285).
71 See, e.g., PLUCKNETT 372-73, Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster II,
31 CoLu . L. REV. 778 (1931) ; Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the
Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142 (1936).
78 2 INSTruTES 408.
79 Plucknett, Case and the Statute of Westminster II, 31 CoLuM. L. REv. 778, 781
(1931).
;0 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *51 [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES].
On the other hand, it is also possible that the rigidity in the law courts to which
Blackstone alluded was a function of the existence of the Chancellor's jurisdiction.
See generally 5 W. HOLDSWoRTH, HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 279-99 (3d ed. 1922).
[Vo1.117:1
JURISPRUDENCE OF REMEDIES
circumstances,"' and that whenever a statute prohibits conduct, any
such action which causes harm may be the basis for an action on the
case.' And in Chisholn v. Georgia,3 Attorney General Randolph
argued that the common law established the principle that no pro-
hibitory act shall be without its vindicatory quality; that an infraction
is still punishable even though no express penalty is provided."4 Ubi
jus ibi remedium was thus carried into American constitutional law
at a very early date." More important than its contemporary vitality
is the coincidence of its rise in popularity with legal developments of
the seventeenth century.
The full relevance of the ability of courts to protect identifiable
interests by the process of remedial growth is found in the seventeenth
century fight for the independence of the judiciary-the notion of
judicial review. The details of the struggle between crown and
Parliament for legislative supremacy cannot detain us here. More
pertinent is the effort by the judiciary, under the leadership of Coke,
to retain the power to apply the whole, the fundamental law, in the
adjudication of ordinary cases86
In his Institutes, Coke stated that "the power and jurisdiction of
the parliament, for making of laws in proceeding by bill, it is so
transcendant and absolute, as it cannot be confined either for causes
or persons within any bounds." 7  This should not be taken to mean
that Coke opted for the supremacy of Parliament as against the same
absolute power in the king; 8 8 he was speaking of a species of judicial
jurisdiction (the "High Court" of Parliament) and not legislation in
the modern sense.
8 9
Coke contributed the notion of Parliamentary supremacy
under the law, which in time, with the differentiation of legis-
lation and adjudication, became transmutable into the notion
811 J. ComYNS, DIGEST 139, 140 (1762).
8
2 Id. at 248.
832 U.S. (Z DalI.) 419 (1793).
84Id. at 422. See generally Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524, 624 (1884) ; Paxton's Case, 1 Quincy 51, 57 (Mass. 1761) ("Pity it would
be, they should have like Right, and not like Remedy; the Law abhors Right without
Remedy.); Adam v. Waltham, Y.B. 21-22 Edw. I. 320, 322 (1294) ; 3 COMMENTARIES
*23; H. BROOM, A SFLECriON OF LEGAL MAXIMS 153-55 (8th ed. 1911); 2 E. CoK,
A COMMENTARY UPON LrrrTLEON f. 197b (F. Hargrave & C. Butler ed. 1832);
A. DIcEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 199 (10th ed. 1959); Plucknett Case and the
Statute of Westminster II, 31 CoLum. L. R v. 778, 783, 786 (1931).
85 See also Justice Wilson's remarks in the case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 456, 460
(1793).
86 Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 628, 638 (C.P. 1610).
87 4 INsTITuTEs 36.
38 But cf. 1 COMMENTARIES *160.
89 Rowles v. Mason, 123 Eng. Rep. 829, 892 (K.B. 1612) ; 2 INSTITUTES 497-98;
4 id. 37; E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GovERNMENT 38 (1948).
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of legislative supremacy within a law subject to construction
by the process of adjudication."
Coke's assertion of common law supremacy disappears in Black-
stone.91 But in spite of the impact of Blackstone on eighteenth century
colonial legal thought,92 his view was clearly rejected in Marbury v.
MadisonY The power of the judiciary to apply fundamental ethics of
liberty transformed into legal norms is secured in the American
experience.
Nevertheless, there has remained in American law a failure to
make a pair of simple but essential connections: to connect the prin-
ciple of judicial review with the process of remedial growth through
the judicial creation of civil actions based upon constitutionally defined
interests in liberty, and to see constitutional guarantees of liberty as
identifiable interests worthy of protection in the same manner as any
other species of interest. In the absence of these connections the words
of Dicey are perhaps somewhat less than realistic:
[T]here runs through the English constitution that insep-
arable connection between the means of enforcing the right
and the right to be enforced which is the strength of judicial
legislation. The saw ubi jus ibi remedium, becomes from this
point of view something much more important than a mere
tautological proposition. In its bearing upon constitutional
law, it means that the Englishmen whose labors gradually
formed the complicated set of laws and institutions which we
call the Constitution, fixed their minds far more intently on
providing remedies for the enforcement of particular rights
or for averting definite wrongs, than upon any declarations of
the Rights of Man or Englishmen. The Habeas Corpus Acts
declare no principle and define no rights, but they are for
practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles
guaranteeing individual liberty. Nor let it be supposed that
this connection between rights and remedies which depends
upon the spirit of law pervading English institutions is in-
consistent with the existence of a written constitution, or
even with the existence of constitutional declarations of
rights. The Constitution of the United States and the con-
stitutions of the separate states are embodied in written or
90 E. CORVIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMEw 57 (1948).
91 "[Tlhere is no court that has the power to defeat the intent of the legislature,
when couched in such evident and express words." 1 COMMENTARIES *91.
"So long . . . as the English Constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm that
the power of Parliament is without control." Id. at *162.
"Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist
without the other." Id. at *46.
92 E. CoRWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 85 (1929).
93 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
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printed documents, and contain declarations of rights. But
the statesmen of America have shown an unrivalled skill in
providing means for giving legal security to the rights
declared by American constitutions. The rule of law is as
marked a feature of the United States as of England. 4
C. Non-Judicially Defined Interests in Tort Adjudication
If we can agree that constitutional interests in liberty have been
defined and delineated in political documents, legislative enactments,
and judicial experience so that these interests are readily discoverable
within acceptable limits of judicial certainty, we can turn our attention
to the form of the remedial system. Specifically, the concern is the
law of torts: the availability of a civil remedy in damages to compen-
sate for harm to constitutional interests in liberty.
As seen in the preceding sections, historical evidence that a tort
remedy has been fundamental to a legal system that sought to protect
well-defined interests in liberty is not conclusive.95 On the other hand,
neither is it trivial. Notions of judicial review that prevailed and
expanded over centuries of experience seem to favor the proposition.
In certain situations the absence of an action in tort meant that behavior
harmful to constitutional interests in liberty would be unreviewable. 6
A modern conceptualism which would permit us to infer the exis-
tence of a broad view of the role and function of the law of torts cannot
be transplanted to the middle ages. There is, nonetheless, much to be
said for tort remedies in terms of historical experience. 7  Statements
of causes of action in tort are simple, traditional and effective means of
achieving judicial review of alleged harms to interests in liberty." The
tort action fulfills the need for a consistent judicial methodology, pre-
serves the political ethic of governmental accountability, minimizes
damage to the effective functioning of government, and serves the deter-
rent function essential to the protection of constitutional interests. 9
The action of trespass as it developed around the middle of the
thirteenth century was initiated by the writ of trespass vi et armis contra
pacern. The peace of the realm was threatened by personal injuries.
Here is manifested the fundamental proposition that an ordered society
94A. DIcEY, LAw OF THE CONSTI UTION 199-200 (7th ed. 1908).
95 Id. at 193, 195.
06 See Tooker's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 562 (K.B. 1612). Compare 43 Edw. 3, c. 3
(1369) ; 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354) ; 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, c. 4 (1351) with Magna Charta
c. 39 (1215). See also text accompanying notes 281-87 infra.
97 SeeCampbell v. Hall, 98 Eng. Rep. 848 (K.B. 1774) ; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98
Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774).
.9See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (Holmes, J.); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
99 See generally pp. 39-44 infra.
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is impossible without a system of redress for wrongs between persons.
The writ system, though far from a full and flexible remedial process,
constituted the manner in which the king did justice between his sub-
jects and provided personal security. Consistently, the later develop-
ment of the action on the case gave redress for indirect rather than
direct harms to the person.'0 0 The administrative impossibility of
direct governmental involvement in all private disputes and the need
for order, personal security and a regime of law in a meaningful sense
of the word could be reconciled in the law of tort.
Today that law covers an enormously broad area of social con-
tact.' 01 But the public element in the adjudication of disputes between
individuals has not been eliminated.0 2 Tort adjudication continues to
involve a determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's activity
in its social context,1 3 the need to protect and perpetuate the harmful
activity,0 4 the fairness of allowing plaintiff's damage to go unre-
dressed, 0 5 and the need to protect and perpetuate the plaintiff's activity
or interest. 0 6
The Constitution, as an attempt to make more perfect a society
that assures its citizens a regime of law, would fall far short of its
objective without some body of rules serving the functions of the
law of torts. We may well ask whether the Constitution does not
require, in the absence of some other effective remedy providing a
means for judicial review of alleged harms to interests in liberty, that
there be available some remedy similar to a cause of action in tort.'
The ordinary tort "action on the statute"-a cause of action in
tort resulting from activity in violation of a legislatively created duty
or standard-is analogous to a tort action claiming harm to interests
in liberty. In some ways the development of the action on the statute
is obscure, but its relation to the concern of this paper is significant
enough to warrant detailed discussion.
The origin of the action on the statute can be traced to the custo-
mary judicial use of money to resolve disputes. Well before the de-
100 PLUCKNET=, supra note 35, at 372.
101 PROSSER, smpra note 33, at 6.
102 See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAgv. L. Rzv. 193-96
(1890); Sax & Hiestand, Shunlordism as a Tort, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 869, 878 (1967).
103 Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 44 Wash. 2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 (1954).
104 Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
105 Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888).
106 Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
10 Cf. Bator, Fitality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 449 (1963) : "[I]t is easy to slip into the assumption
that the right [to habeas corpus] has a kind of ultimate reality or existence apart from
the institutional processes which we create to determine whether the right has been
violated in a particular case."
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velopment of trespass as a distinct form of action, money had been
awarded in criminal appeals and the assize of novel disseisin."' The
money awarded was a common form of resolution upon procurement of
licentia concordandi, or leave to compromise.0 9 Leave was necessary
because the plaintiff had pledged assurance that the litigation was other
than vexatious." 0  Licentia concordandi was freely granted where the
parties were able to settle their differences."'
These early usages do not establish the origins of trespass or the
action on the statute. They do demonstrate early judicial familiarity
with money as a means of protecting both royal and private interests
in settling disputes." 2
A second reason for the flexibility of the forms of action
in the early thirteenth century [the first being the effort by the
the king's court to draw judicial business away from the
feudal courts] lies in the principle of damages, so important
in English law, which had been introduced through the me-
dium of the assize of novel disseisin and was gradually spread-
ing to other forms of action. Until after 1250 these actions
for damages took no one fixed form, but were brought usually
by a complaint in the form of a quare writ out of Chancery."3
Crimes, in general, were not only offenses against the king's peace but
trespasses to the person. Disseisin, which lay for either actual loss of
possession or nuisance, such as destruction of a mill or diversion of a
water course, was often accompanied by force," 4 injury to land or loss
or damage to personal property. By the end of the twelfth century
damages were the principal means of redressing such wrongs." 5
Prior to the emergence of the common law there existed two main
types of procedure under what was then the Germanic customary law.
One was a demand for specific relief, praecipe quod reddat, the other a
108 R. CAENEGEm, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANv
291-92 (Selden Society 1958) ; C. FLOWER, INTRODUCrION TO THE CURIA REGIS ROLLS
159, 165, 473 (Selden Society 1944) ; PLUCKNITT, supra note 35, at 369; A. SIMpSON,
INTRODUCTION TO THE HiSTORY OF THE LAND LAw 29 (1961); Thorne, Livery of
Seisin, 52 L.Q. REv. 345, 358 (1936).
109 2 COMMENTARIES *350; D. STENTON, ENGLISH JUSTICE BErxWEN THE NORMAN
CONQUEST AND THE GREAT CHARTER (1066-1215), at 7-10 (1964); FLOWER, supra note
108, at 480-98.
1102 COMMENrARIEs *350; D. STENTON, supra note 109, at 43; CAENEGEM, Mspra
note 108, at 293.
i D. STENTON, supra note 109, at 51.
112 Originally, around 1166, novel disseisin was a criminal action; it soon devel-
oped into a mixed institution. Caenegem, supra note 108, at 297.
13 Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YAL L.J. 1142
(1936). See also PLUCKNxET, supra note 35, at 369-72.
"4See, e.g., Guleford v. Tergot, Y.B. Pasch. 21 & 22 Edw. 1 (1293), cited in
PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 357 n.4.
115 A. Simpn'soN, supra note 108, at 29, putting the earliest case in 1198.
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complaint of wrong, quare, looking toward compensation by way of
bot or similar settlement."-6 The development of the common law in
the king's courts of the thirteenth century built upon these customary
practices.
One of the structures created was the action on the statute. The
difficulty of precise proof of this proposition stems from the concurrent
development of trespass on the case. An action upon the case "may
recite the 'custom of the realm' (as against innkeepers), or it may recite
one of the scores of statutes the breach of which caused loss to the
plaintiff .... ," "' Thus the action on the statute is not, and never
was, a distinct form of action as opposed to a theory of recovery. In
the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, actions labeled "trespass"
were being brought upon statutes whether or not they provided in
terms for special penalties.1
An interesting example of these early actions upon statutes is
Symond v. Hillyngton,"9 an action in trespass upon the Statute of
Labourers,' ° which made criminal the departure of a servant from the
employ of his master. The defendants in the case were the servant and
one who took him away. Damages were awarded.
The fourteenth century Statutes of Forcible Entry 121 were crim-
inal enactments designed to punish bands of men who invaded private
lands, disrupting peaceful possession or causing ouster. Cases found
to the end of the fifteenth century cite these statutes as the basis for
civil actions, even though later statutes of Henry IV ' and Henry
VI -2 added provisions for double and treble damages respectively. It
may be that the absence from the earlier statutes of any provision for
a distinct writ created the impression that no action for damages would
lie at law. 24 But by 1470, ordinary trespass actions appear with some
regularity.125 Appeals from awards of damages in these cases were
being taken to the King's Council by parties who could not enforce
their money judgments. 26
116 PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 372; Dix, supra note 113, at 1150.
117 PLUCKNETT, supra note 35, at 372.
11s Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to Edward III, Part 11: Special Writs,
74 L.Q. Rv. 407, 428 (1958).
119"Y.B. 1 Hen. 6 (1422), 50 SELDEN SociEry 10 (1933).
12023 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1349).
1215 Ric. 2, c. 7 (1381) ; 15 Ric. 2, c. 2 (1391).
224 Hen. 4, c. 8, §3 (1402).
12 8 Hen. 6, c. 9, § 6 (1429).
124 Petition to the Bishop of Exeter, Chancellor of England (ca. 1398), in SELECt
CASES IN CHANCERY, 10 SELDEN SocirY 83 (W. Baildon ed. 1896).
=5 Prior of Bruton v. Ede, Y.B. Pasch. 10 Edw. 4 (1470), 47 SELDEN SOCIETY 31
(1930) ; Bevyne v. Wodecokke, id. at 50.
126 Jackson v. Ernely (1489), in Bayne, Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII,
75 SnDEN Socrm-y 68 (1956) ; Dyer v. Clinton (1497), id. at 111.
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One might speculate that, had this development continued un-
restricted, we would today have damage actions for violations of con-
stitutionally guaranteed interests in liberty being brought as a matter
of course. If such an action is permitted upon criminal statutes de-
fining interests in personal security such an action may, it would
seem, be brought upon constitutional provisions defining interests in
personal liberty. However, somewhere between the sixteenth and
eighteenth centuries there evolved an apparent judicial reluctance to
allow actions upon statutes for the recovery of money awards.
The explanation for this development appears in the political
climate of the seventeenth century. Up to and through the Tudor
Reformation the supreme law-making power became ever increasingly
lodged in the Parliament.127 The representative character of that body
led to greater legitimacy for its enactments. Indeed, the "will" of
Parliament assumes the same mantle of supremacy worn by the crown
in centuries past. 2 " Henceforth the intent of the lawmaking branch
becomes a factor of primary significance in the development of the
common law. To permit civil actions upon criminal or regulatory
legislation which did not provide for such remedies was thought some-
how to add to the written law. According to this theory the remedial
question raised in Bell v. Hood would be resolved by noting that
neither the Constitution nor any act of Congress specifically provided
for a remedy in damages to redress federal violations of interests in
liberty." 9 However, the historical development of the theory will not
support so broad a statement.
Two lines of argument can be identified in the earliest cases. One
line asserted that the remedy attached to a new piece of legislation
should be construed as exclusive until a backlog of common law ex-
perience integrated the legislation with the existing body of common
law rights of action, or the legislature, in adding to its provisions,
treated it as a common law right of action. This view would not allow
a conservative treatment of interests in liberty insofar as they had
their origin in the common law and were anything but new.
The second, more modern, strand argued that the question
whether or not a damage remedy was to be allowed depended on the
way in which the statutory "penalty" was defined. If the penalty were
defined as a "sum certain," damages could be awarded to the private
127E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND oF AmEmiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 41 (1930).
1 No better expression of this sentiment can be found than the words of Black-
stone, supra note 91.
129 Such statutes exist, of course, for violations "under color of" state law, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), and by private persons acting in conspiracy, 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1964).
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plaintiff, but if defined in "uncertain" terms 13o any award had to be
confined to the statutory scheme. This approach is more modern in
the sense that it attempts to reflect the legal policy in terms of com-
pensation rather than penalties. The wrong to the plaintiff is treated
here as something distinct from the punitive sanction. However,
subsequent to its appearance in the following few cases this second line
of analysis does not reappear until the decision in Couch v. Steel ' '
two hundred years later.
Consideration of some of the cases from the mid-seventeenth
century to the end of the nineteenth century sheds light on the work-
ings of this supposed judicial deference. In Robert Pilfold's Case,"v
the plaintiff sued in trespass quare clausum fregit, praying damages in
the amount of ten pounds. The defendant appealed from the award
of costs to the plaintiff. The court held:
In all cases where a man either before, or by the same statute
shall not recover damages, if after the said Act another
statute in a new case gives damages, either single, double or
treble, &c. there the plaintiff shall not recover costs, for this
Act is an Act of Creation, which creates and gives a recom-
pence to the plaintiff, where in the same case no recompence
was given before.
But otherwise it is of an Act of Addition, which adds
greater recompence and satisfaction than was given before
such Act: for where damages and costs were given by the
common law, but the Act increases the damages, there the
plaintiff shall recover his damages increased by the statute,
and also costs.
James v. Tintny "8 was a writ of error to reverse a judgment of
the Common Pleas for the defendant. Plaintiff sued in replevin to
recover property taken by distress. Common Pleas held for the de-
fendant and awarded damages, which award was assigned as error.
Under the statute of 21 Hen. VIII, c. 19 (1530), damages could be
awarded to the defendant to the extent they would have been awarded
to the plaintiff had he prevailed in certain kinds of actions. The Lord
Chief Justice argued that no damages should be awarded in this case
because the matter was not within the statute. In dictum he stated
that if a statute gave damages where none were available before, the
winning party could not have costs because the statute is one of
"creation." But if the statute gave damages where they could have
13o E.g., when provision was made for treble damages.
131 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1854). See notes 152-57 infra and accompanying
text for a discussion of the case.
132 77 Eng. Rep. 1102, 1103-04 (K.B. 1612).
13 3 Argument of the Lord Chief Justice, 82 Eng. Rep. 396 (1639).
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been recovered at common law or by force of preexisting statute, then
the party could have his costs because the statute is an act of "addition"
and not of creation.
This distinction was again raised in North v. Musgrave.34 North
brought an action in debt upon the statute, an Act for the Impounding
of Distresses, 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. c. 12,"35 claiming that he had suffered
a distress of ten pence contrary to the provisions of the statute. Judg-
ment in Common Pleas was in his favor for the statutory forfeiture
plus damages. The defendant claimed as his third assignment of error
that costs and damages are given, which ought not to be
upon a penal law. For he ought not to have more than the
statute giveth; and therefore upon the Statute of Perjury,
no costs are given: so upon the Statute of Gloucester [for
Waste], the plaintiff shall recover no more than the treble
value.
Rolls, for the plaintiff, replied that there were many precedents where
damages were given upon the statute in issue, and offered the following
analysis:
where the penalty given by the statute is certain, as here,
upon which he may bring debt, there he shall recover dam-
ages: but where the penalty is uncertain, as upon the Statute
of Gloucester, for treble damages, the statute which giveth
the treble value, and the like; there, because it is incertain,
he shall have no more.136
The case was adjourned and further argument subsequently heard.
At this time Maynard for the defendant cited Pilfold's Case for the
proposition that no more than the statutory penalty ought to have been
awarded. 37 Rolls disagreed, arguing that the case was not within
Pilfold's Case "because that the Action is not a new Action, but the
thing is a new thing, for which the old action is given." 3  The court
agreed on the judgment as rendered below but split on the awarding
of costs, Justice Barclay, on the authority of Pilfold's Case, saying
they should not be allowed.
In Ashby v. White, 39 the plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully
deprived of his right to vote in parliamentary elections and brought
134 82 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B. 1639).
135 (1554). "That no man shall take for keeping in pound, impounding, or pound-
age of any manner of distress, above the sum of four pence, upon pain of forfeiture of
five pounds, to be paid to the party grieved."
36 82 Eng. Rep. at 410.
137Id. at 411-12.
238 Id. at 412.
139 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703), cited with approval in Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
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an action on the case for damages. Ashby is particularly important:
the right asserted was political in the broadest sense, and the conduct
complained of had been designated by the legislature as a public offense.
Ashby's claim was not grounded upon an "act of creation," the penalty
provided by statute was not compensatory and, if any sum was involved
at all, it was stated in a sum certain. Most important, the case raised
the issue whether the right to vote in a parliamentary election was an
interest in liberty personal to the plaintiff that he could assert in a
civil action.
Three members of the King's Bench held for the defendant, say-
ing, inter alia: the matter was a public offense and therefore no action
was given to the party; it was for Parliament to determine in the first
instance whether there was a right to vote before an action could be
brought for injury to that right; as a matter of statute the courts are
bound by determinations of Parliament in matters of elections and may
not act in the absence thereof, and therefore Turner v. Sterling ... is
distinguishable; if Parliament shall determine the party had a right to
vote he may have his action at law for damages; by analogy to cases
of public nuisance, no action will lie for damages where there is a
remedy available by presentment, which again distinguishes Turner
because there no other remedy was available.
The strangeness of the syllogistic argument can only be explained
by a primary desire to avoid remedial creativity. Certainly the opinion
stands or falls on the question whether, by making interference with
the right to vote a public offense, Parliament has determined there is a
right to vote. Evidently three members of the King's Bench thought
not. For them the interest in voting was protected only by the criminal
law and not the law of torts-for no reason other than the silence of
Parliament.
Chief Justice Holt disagreed with his brothers in an opinion now
famous for its libertarian ethics."4 He found that the plaintiff did have
a right to vote by statute, and that therefore an action on the case
would lie.
A right that a man has to give his vote at an election of a
person to represent him in Parliament, there to concur to the
making of laws, which are to bind his liberty and property,
is a most transcendent thing, and of an high nature, and the
law takes notice of it as such in divers statutes. . .. The
right of voting at the election of burgesses is a thing of high-
140 86 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1683), holding that an action on the case would lie
against the mayor of a town for refusing to perform his customary duties in the ap-
pointment of bridgemasters.
1
4 1 See Sax & Hiestand, supra note 102, at 879.
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est importance, and so great a privilege, that it is a great
injury to deprive the plaintiff of it ....
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means
to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured
in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain
thing to imagine a right without a remedy; for . . . want of
right and want of remedy are reciprocal. 3
It would look very strange, when the commons of England
are so fond of their right of sending representatives to Parlia-
ment, that it should be in the power of a sheriff, or other
officer, to deprive them of that right, and yet that they should
have no remedy; it is a thing to be admired at by all man-
kind.
14
Where a new Act of Parliament is made for the benefit of the
subject, if a man be hindered from the enjoyment of it, he
shall have an action against such person who so obstructed
him. . . . [B]y West. I [Statute of Westminster First], 3
Ed. 1, c. 5, [1275], it is enacted, that forasmuch as elections
ought to be free, the King forbids, upon grievous forfeiture,
that any great man, or other, by power of arms, or by malice
or menaces, shall disturb to make free elections. 2 Inst. 168,
169. And this statute, as my Lord Coke observes, is only an
enforcement of the common law; and if the Parliament
thought the freedom of elections to be a matter of that conse-
quence, as to give their sanction to it, and to enact that they
should be free; it is a violation of that statute, to disturb the
plaintiff in this case in giving his vote at an election, and con-
sequently actionable. 45
The Chief Justice's dissenting opinion was accepted by the House
of Lords, which reversed the King's Bench and entered judgment for
the plaintiff. If Chief Justice Holt's opinion is taken as the prevailing
theoretical view, the following proposition should be settled: interests
in liberty may be asserted in civil actions for damages even where a
criminal penalty is attached to a legislatively defined right. Further-
more, in the absence of statute, the common law conception would apply
without the barrier of legislative intent. Since the right asserted would
be "only an enforcement of the common law," the full range of remedial
power would be available.
The cases subsequent to Ashby substantially complicate the prob-
lem. None of the opinions attempt to distinguish Ashby on the ground
that no interest in liberty was being asserted by the plaintiff. It is
14: 92 Eng. Rep. at 135-36.
1
4 3 Id. at 136.
44Id.
145 Id. at 136-37.
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therefore difficult to decide if they can be explained on this silently
understood ground; on the ground that the courts misunderstood the
holding of Ashby; or on the ground that additional complicating factors
were present. The complicating factors are implicit in the questions
raised by these cases: (a) Will an action in tort for damages lie upon a
criminal statute? (b) Will an action in tort for damages lie upon a
statute providing for a penalty payable to someone other than the
plaintiff? (c) Will an action in tort for damages lie upon a statute
providing for a penalty payable to the plaintiff? (d) Will an action
in tort for damages lie upon a statute specifically providing for enforce-
ment by some other form of action?
In one type of case the plaintiff sues either in trover or debt,14
but the relevant statute provides for a remedy in distress.1 47  These
cases uniformly hold that where the statute provides for recovery in a
specified manner it may be enforced in that manner and no other. One
of them, Underhill v. Ellicombe,14 distinguished this kind of case from
those involving a statutory penalty with no mode of recovery prescribed,
but made no distinction between statutes providing for recovery in
sums certain and those providing for recovery in sums uncertain. Nor
146 Stevens v. Evans, 97 Eng. Rep. 761, 763 (K.B. 1761) : "It is a rule, 'that upon
a new statute which proscribes a particular remedy; no remedy can be taken, but the
particular remedy provided by the statute.' Therefore clearly, no action of debt will
lie for a poor's rate [43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1597)]." No authority was cited. But see
Pilfold's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1102 (K.B. 1612).
147 Doe dern. Murray v. Bridges, 109 Eng. Rep. 1001, 1005-6 (K.B. 1831) : "And
as the Act [the Tax Redemption Act, 42 Geo. 3, c. 116, § 88 (1802) ] has provided for
[the tax] payment and recovery in this manner [distress], it appears to us that there
can be no other mode of enforcing the payment . . . . And where the Act creates
an obligation, and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a
general rule that performance can not be enforced in any other manner. If an obli-
gation is created, but no mode of enforcing its performance is ordained, the common
law may, in general, find a mode suited to the particular nature of the case."
148 148 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ex. 1825). The plaintiff here sued in debt to collect com-
position money duly assessed in lieu of a statutory duty, 13 Geo. 3, c. 78, § 34 (1773).
Baron, L.C., held:
This is a claim given by statute, and the same statute which creates it pre-
scribes a particular remedy [distress] for its enforcement. Therefore, it
appears to us that no other can be resorted to. . . . These are statutes which
establish the right, to enforce which the present action has been brought. In
creating the right, they also direct the remedy; and we have found no authority
that any other can be pursued. No case in point has been stated in support
of the action, and it appears to be a rather new experiment.
j . * The cases which were cited in support of the action do not main-
tain the proposition for which they were adduced. Generally they go to shew,
that if a statute prohibits the doing of a thing under a penalty, to be paid to
the party grieved, or without saying to whom it shall be paid, and does not
prescribe any mode of recovery, this action may, in such case, be maintained
by the party grieved, and for that there are many other authorities. Com.
Dig. tit. "Debt," (A.), 1, Presid. &c. of Physicians v. Solmond, 1 Ld. Raym.
680 [91 Eng. Rep. 1353 (K.B. 1701)].
148 Eng. Rep. at 491-92. See also Dundalk Western Ry. v. Tapster, 113 Eng. Rep.
1287-1288 (Q.B. 1841) : "The right and the remedy are both created by the Legis-
lature, and the company are bound to pursue the remedy provided by it."
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did Underhill say whether special damages could be had where the
statute specified a sum certain recoverable in any mode. This was the
issue in North v. Musgrave. And finally, Underhill did not deal with
cases involving a criminal statute without provision for a penalty or
forfeiture. That was the issue in Ashby v. White.
The relevant statute in Stevens v. Jeacocke 149 provided for a for-
feiture and penalty payable to the plaintiff but did not specify any
particular mode of recovery.5 Nevertheless, the court held for the
defendant on the authority of the Underhill line of cases.15 The court
in Stevens failed to see the difference between questions (c) and (d)
noted above. The policy problem in the former is whether the statutory
penalty should be all the plaintiff recovers, that is, whether it should be
viewed as something in the nature of a limitation on liability (or liqui-
dated damages). Question (d) raises the distinct issue whether the
specification of a particular form or mode of proceeding was intended
as exclusive, or whether exclusiveness is supported by any significant
policy consideration.
Couch v. Steel 'I 2 was an action by a seaman against the owner of
his vessel for failure to keep aboard sufficient medical supplies. The
statute '5 3 provided for a penalty of twenty pounds recoverable at the
suit of any person payable in part to the "informer" and in part to the
Seaman's Hospital Society. Lord Campbell initiated his analysis by
noting that were it not for the penalty there would be no question that
an action could be maintained for damages.5 " The general rule, he
said, was that an action on the case would lie where one is harmed by
the wrong of another,'55 and that a remedy lies upon every statute
enacted for the benefit of the person where he suffers from a wrong
done contrary to the statute. 6 Coming to the penalty provision, Lord
Campbell said:
If the performance of a new duty created by Act of Parliament
is enforced by a penalty, recoverable by the party grieved by
'49 116 Eng. Rep. 647 (Q.B. 1848).
150 4 & 5 Vic., c. 57 (1841).
'5' 116 Eng. Rep. at 652:
That therefore, if any infringement of a right was shewn, it was one in re-
spect of which a specific remedy had been given: and that it was [sic] a rule
of law that an action will not lie for the infringement of a right created by
statute, where another specific remedy for infringement is provided by the
same statute. . . . [Citing Underhill and Doe dem. Murray v. Bridges].
152 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1854).
36 7 & 8 Vic., c. 112, § 18 (1844).
154 But see Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (tKB. 1703).
155 See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
156 For the latter proposition he cited J. ComYNs, DIGEST s.v. "Action Upon the
Statute" (1762); for the former, the Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, c. 50
(1285). 118 Eng. Rep. at 1196.
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the non-performance, there is no other remedy than that given
by the Act, either for the public or private wrong; but, by the
penalty given by the act now in question . . . compensation
for private special damage seems not to have been contem-
plated. The penalty is recoverable in case of a breach of the
public duty, though no damage may have been actually sus-
tained by anybody; and no authority has been cited to us, nor
are we aware of any, in which it has been held that, in such a
case as the present, the common law right to maintain an
action in respect of a special damage resulting from the breach
of a public duty (whether such duty exists at common law or
is created by statute) is taken away by reason of a penalty,
recoverable by a common informer, being annexed as a punish-
ment for the non-performance of the public duty."'
Of the six cases dealt with here compensatory recovery was granted
in two and denied in four. Comparing the two groups of cases yields
interesting results.
In the four cases in which recovery was denied "s the statutes
involved provided for a mode of recovery that would compensate the
plaintiff in money. In three of these four the plaintiff attempted to use
some other form of action than that provided by the statute. Those
cases were readily distinguishable from Ashby and Couch, where no
mode of recovery existed which would provide the plaintiff with per-
sonal compensation in money. It is this statutory availability of personal
compensation which reconciles the decisions. The really difficult case is
Stevens v. Jeacocke, wherein the statute provided for a forfeiture and a
"penalty" or "fine" payable to the party injured.'59 The difficulty is in
deciding whether the money provision represents something like a
criminal penalty or is more in the nature of a limitation on liability.
Prosser argues:
The fact that [legislation providing that under certain circum-
stances particular acts shall or shall not be done] is usually
penal in character, and carries with it a criminal penalty, will
not prevent its use in imposing civil liability, except in the
comparatively rare case where the penalty is made payable
to the person injured, and clearly is intended to be in lieu of
all other compensation.'
In determining this, the amount of the penalty is important
as an indication of legislative intent.''
157 118 Eng. Rep. at 1197.
158 Stevens v. Evans, 92 Eng. Rep. 761 (K.B. 1761) ; Underhill v. Ellicombe, 148
Eng. Rep. 489 (Ex. 1825); Doe dent. Murray v. Bridges, 97 Eng. Rep. 1001 (K.B.
1831) ; Stevens v. Jeacocke, 116 Eng. Rep. 647 (Q.B. 1848).
169 Cf. Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks, 2 Ex. D. 441 (1877) ; North v. Mus-
grave, 82 Eng. Rep. 410, 411 (K.B. 1639) ; Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1197
(Q.B. 1854).
160 PRossER, supra note 33, at 192.
161 Id. at n.88 (citing Groves v. Wimborne, 2 Q.B. 402 (1898)).
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Recall the explanation and analysis offered by Sergeant Rolls in
North v. Musgrave: 12 where the statute provides for a sum certain,
additional damages shall be allowed, but where the sum is uncertain,
he shall have no more. This distinction is more useful than Prosser's
formula as a vehicle for discovering the legislative intent-for it is to
legislative intent that we ultimately return. Sums certain as defined
by statute are unlikely to have any reasonable relationship to the
damage suffered, and consequently do not serve to compensate for
actual loss. It is probable, on the other hand, that a general provision
for recovery of damages-"uncertain" because it requires a computation
in each instance-will compensate for the actual loss suffered. What
is the reason for this judicial interest in compensation for loss?
Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation is that the
courts are seeking, by something in the nature of judicial
legislation, to further the ultimate policy for the protection
of individuals, which they find underlying the statute, and
which they believe the legislature must have had in mind.
The statutory standard of conduct is simply adopted vol-
untarily, out of deference and respect for the legislature. '
3
I think it safe to conclude that the reluctance to grant actions
upon statutes for money damages during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries is more apparent than real. Deference to legislative expression
was a significant barrier only where the statute specified a mode of
proceeding or a fixed sum penalty payable to the plaintiff. Obviously
such considerations are inapplicable in actions to enforce interests de-
fined by the Constitution. None of the ordinary barriers to judicial
creativity are present. Constitutional rights are not "new" or the
products of "acts of creation." They are of common law origin which
predates their inclusion in a formal document. 64 Since the Con-
stitution is not a criminal statute no remedy by presentment is avail-
able. It provides for no penalties payable either to plaintiffs or others.
It defines no specific or particular mode of enforcement that would
enable exclusive construction. It provides for no cause of action in
tort for compensatory damages. In short, there is no affirmative
remedy at law that will protect constitutionally defined interests in
liberty.
16215 Car. 1 (1639), March's Cases 56 (1675).
183 PROSSER, supra note 33, at 193.
164 A. DICEY, LAw OF THE CoNsTrruTiox 196, 198 (7th ed. 1908); see United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1873).
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Dispute in the twentieth century has been confined, in the main,
to distinguishing tort policy from the policy of criminal or regulatory
law. A few central points are worthy of note.
Professor Lowndes argued that only criminal conduct deemed
so unreasonable that it ought to be penalized by the civil as well as
the criminal law ought to be held to create civil liability." There
are two errors of thought here. First, the statement turns legal
method on its head. A standard of care is defined to protect certain
social interests. If a particular interest is sufficiently vital, the criminal
law is chosen out of the grab-bag of enforcement tools. In a rational
system, the severest sanctions are applied with reservation. Lowndes
seems to say that only those who commit "super-crimes" should be
held accountable by the civil as well as the criminal law. But the force
of the criminal law is seldom exhausted; Lowndes fails to explain why
its force should be increased externally rather than internally. On the
other hand, if he means only that unreasonable conduct should be
deterred by some careful combination of criminal and civil sanction,
I would agree. For good or ill, however, the law is not so structured
at the present time. Ultimately, it is difficult to conceive of conduct
so unreasonable as to be criminal but not so unreasonable as to be
tortious.166
Second, Lowndes restricts the purposes of tort liability to punish-
ment and deterrence, and ignores the factor of individual compensation
for harm suffered. Nor does he deal with the factual probability that
tort liability may be the only method of enforcing the defendant's re-
sponsibility in the absence of prosecution.'67
Professor Thayer took another view of the issue:
Whenever due care is in issue, the breach of the statute sup-
plies the legal equivalent of negligence. The defendant is in
no position to meet the test of the prudent man. 6
He did not, however, foreclose denial of civil remedy for other, over-
riding policy considerations." 9
165 Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Crininal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV.
361, 370 (1931).
16 6 Lowndes concludes otherwise: "Carelessness may be criminal, but does it fol-
low that criminality is careless?" 16 MINN. L. REv. at 369. See also Weiner, The
Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1867, 1885-86 (1966).
16
7 See the discussion of Ashby v. White in the text accompanying notes 139-45
.supra.
168 Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HAxv. L. Rxv. 317, 334 (1913).
169 Using the criminal law to define the standard of care does not necessarily re-
sult in the creation of strict liability. Defenses such as necessity, or reasonable effort
to conform conduct to law, may be material to tort adjudication. See Morris, The
Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. REv. 453, 458-60 (1932) ;




Regulatory legislation has also been used extensively by courts
as a basis for tort liability in damages.
Particularly when regulated conduct has been expressly pro-
scribed by Congress, the [federal] courts have been quick
to infer or recognize private remedies to aid those whom the
statute was designed to protect. 70
This predisposition toward private remedies is significant for two
reasons. Intricate considerations, not present with regard to more
isolated statutory duties, militate against the creation of damage actions
on regulatory legislation.' 7 ' It would seem reasonable to expect dislike
of the private remedy to be manifested in the latter rather than the
former situation. Second, the willingness of the federal courts to
employ the private remedy is, in view of my concern with constitutional
interests in liberty, highly relevant.
D. Actions on Statutes in Federal Practice and Theory
In construing federal legislation the federal courts quite clearly
apply the approach of Couch v. Steel: 2 in the absence of contrary
legislative intent,'73 an action will lie for breach of a statutory duty
provided such remedy is consistent with the purpose of the legislation.
The instances in which this principle has been applied are too numerous
to discuss in detail here." One case, however, is worthy of particular
mention by way of example.
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak 17 was a damage action for loss suffered
due to defendants' violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.176 The section was intended to
control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited
with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which
17o O'Neil, Pitblic Regulation and Private Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REv.
231, 259 (1964).
17 1.See generally id. at 264-68.
172 Cited in Reitmeister v. Reitmelster, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947) (L.
Hand, 3.).
173 E.g, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 207(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6 (Supp. II, 1966).
174E.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 662, 664 n.12 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S.
210, 213 (1944); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947)'; Wills v.
T.W.A., 200 F. Supp. 360, 364 (S.D. Calif. 1961); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon
Stock Exchange Rides, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 12 (1966); Lowenfels, Private Enforce-
ment in the Over-the-Counter Securities Market: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD
Rides, 51 CORNELL L. REv. 633 (1966) ; O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private Rights
of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 231, 259 (1964) ; Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for
Damages Under Statutes Not Affording Such Remedy, 48 COLUm. L. REv. 1090
(1948).
175 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
17615 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1964).
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. . . [had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders.
1 77
The act granted to district courts jurisdiction over all suits in equity
and actions at law to enforce duties created therein.17 8  In passing on
the significance of this jurisdictional grant, the Court quoted the
following language from Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.: 179
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the
right of recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to
make the right of recovery effective implies the power to
utilize any of the procedures or actions normally available to
the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular
case. 18
0
While the Act made no specific reference to private rights of action,
the Court found that "among its chief purposes is 'the protection of
investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief
where necessary to achieve that result." 181
The remedial flexibility of the federal courts was explained in
the following way:
It is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief" where federally secured rights are
invaded. "And it is also well settled that where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general
right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)."'
177 377 U.S. at 431.
178 Id.; cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
179 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
180 377 U.S. at 433-34.
181377 U.S. at 432.
1 377 U.S. at 433; cf. Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 366 (1944).
Since this paper was prepared, the Supreme Court has decided Wyandotte Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), in an opinion entirely consistent with the view
expressed here:
This rule [that the United States may sue to protect its interests] is not
necessarily inapplicable when the particular governmental interest sought to
be protected is expressed in a statute carrying criminal penalties for its
violation. Our decisions in cases involving civil actions of private parties
based on the violation of a penal statute so indicate. In those cases we con-
cluded that criminal liability was inadequate to ensure the full effectiveness
of the statute which Congress had intended. Because the interest of the plain-
tiffs in those cases fell within the class that the statute was intended to protect,
and because the harm that had occurred was of the type that the statute was
intended to forestall, we held that civil actions were proper. That conclusion
was in accordance with the general rule of the law of torts. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts sec. 286.
389 U.S. at 201-02 (most citations omitted).
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The decision in I. I. Case is a function of the presence of four
dependent variables: (a) the protective purposes of the statute; (b) the
absence of contrary legislative expression; (c) the grant of general
jurisdiction to the federal courts; and (d) the inherent power of the
federal courts to adjust remedies to meet needs.
In what way is the Bill of Rights so different from acts of
Congress that courts will devise an effective remedial system to enforce
the duties created by the latter but not the former? Is not the Con-
stitution a "super-statute" in the sense that, if it does differ from
ordinary legislation, its commands must be taken more seriously, its
effectiveness must be more profound? Certainly the political ethic that
creates the duties upon which the fabric of our civil society depends
deserves at least as much remedial implementation as section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
If it is the absence of contrary legislative expression which frees
the courts to engage in remedial creativity in the case of ordinary
statutes, why is it not also true that the absence of such expression
either in the Constitution or by the Congress enables the courts to
fashion remedies protective of constitutional interests in liberty? Put
another way, is there something in the Constitution or about its struc-
ture that renders it in this respect different from an ordinary statute?
If a grant of general jurisdiction in a statute provides the basis
for remedial creativity to enforce the duties created by the statute, why
does not the grant of general federal question jurisdiction provide the
basis for remedial creativity to enforce duties created by the Con-
stitution? Why should there be an inherent power in the federal
courts to adjust remedies to meet needs in a statutory but not in a
constitutional context?
III. THE CONSTITUTION AS LAW
A. Interests in Liberty and Analytical Jurisprudence
Constitutionally defined interests in liberty, as rules of decision in
ordinary cases, ought to be accorded the same legal status as other
authoritative pronouncements. Interests in liberty can function as rules
of decision only because, apart from their essence as statements of
political ethics," 3 they carry with them the force of ultimate author-
ity.18
4
183 There is much in the writing of Learned Hand that could lead one to conclude
that he did not see the Constitution as law in the ordinary sense, at least not the Bill
of Rights. In any event, he was far from convinced that in implementing constitu-
tional interests in liberty, the courts were enforcing law. See L. HAxD, THE SpIrr
OF LI aBTY 73, 159-62, 277-78 (2d ed. 1953).
184 Jacques Maritain argued that one cannot identify law and the legal order with
the state-for the state is but part of the whole, which he called the body politic. For
1968]
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Madison described the Bill of Rights as "prescriptions in favor of
liberty [that] ought to be levelled against that quarter where the
greatest danger lies." "s They were placed in the document in order
to provide final criteria for determining the authority of government to
make and enforce law. The inclusion of interests in liberty in a docu-
ment that thus functions as a code of procedure '8 6 has led some com-
mentators to characterize them as merely "limitations" on power.'
This characterization has resulted in a construction requiring the very
existence of a private interest to be inferred from the "defect of
power." 188
This view, so dearly embraced by analytical jurisprudence,8 9 at-
tempts to transmogrify a difference in intellectual approach into a dis-
tinction of legal significance. "Thou shall commit no murder" is a
prescription directed to private persons placing limits on their freedom
to act. It is also expressive of a human purpose: '° an individual's
Maritain it was possible for the body politic to create the state as an instrument for
the ordering of its affairs. By so doing, the state did not become the law or the
source of law. Furthermore, in the process of creating the state it was possible for the
people to define their interests in liberty and require those interests to be implemented
as law. The definition of those interests by the body politic directly does not make
them any less law than those instrumental activities that are directly the product of
the state in its management function. J. MARrrAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 1-27 (1960).
Corwin's thoughts are closely related to those of Maritain. In his numerous books,
Corwin attempted to prove that the Constitution was more than a document "laying
down the general features of a system of government." Corwin, Constitution v. Con-
stitutional Theory, 19 Am. Poi. Sci. REv. 290, 291, 302 (1925); see E. CoRwiN,
LIBFRTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 10-11, 57 (1948). See also K. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS
FACT 40-41 (1962).
Hans Kelsen is contrary to Maritain: he identifies law and the state, arguing that
since the chief characteristic of a state is the coercive ordering of human behavior, the
existence of an identical primary characteristic in the law destroys any supposed
dualism. For Kelsen the confusion arises from the personification of the state as a
creator of law. But since in the Kelsen system the creation of law is always in ac-
cordance with some higher legal norm, saying that the state creates the law can mean
only that the law regulates its own creation. H. KELsEN, WHAT Is JusTicE 281-82
(1957).
18 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 382 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
186 L. HAND, THE SPIRIT op LIBERTY 159 (2d ed. 1953); H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCFPT OF LAW 78-79 (1961).
187 See notes 205-07 infra and accompanying text.
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., H. M. HART & A. SACHS, THE: LE AL PRoCESS 141-55 (tent. ed 1958);
D. LLoyd, THE IDEA OF LAW 312-18 (1964) ; Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology
29 YALE LJ. 163 (1919) ; Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) ; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions as Applied in Jutdicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) ; Radin, Restatement
of Hohfeld, 51 HARv. L. REv. 1141 (1938). Professor Edgar Bodenheimer notes that
Hohfeld's "classifications of legal concepts have never been adopted by the courts."
Bodenheimer, Modern Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of its Usefulness, 104
U. PA. L. REv. 1080, 1082 (1956).
-90 See, e.g., Corwin, Constitution v. Constitutional Theory, 19 Am. PoL. Sci.
REv. 290, 302 (1925) : "The Constitution is thus always in contact with the sources of
its being-it is a living statute, to be interpreted in the light of living conditions."
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv.
630, 646 (1958) : "It is [Hart's] neglect to analyze the demands of a morality of order
that leads him throughout his essay to treat law as a datum projecting itself into human
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interest in the security of his person. Recognizing the interest in law
is a matter entirely different from deciding what remedial significance
may attach to its assertion.1 91 The Bill of Rights gave legal recognition
to the interests in liberty contained therein. It is our task to make the
remedial decisions.
If interests in liberty are to be implemented in a manner distin-
guishable from, for example, section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the difference must be found in a sound construction of
purpose. In other words, the refusal to apply so much of the remedial
law as will make effective one purpose but not another must be ration-
ally justified. 9 ' What is at issue here is not only the necessity of a
money judgment, but the coherence of legal policy.
A failure to see the purposeful nature of legal constructs infects
the foundations of analytical jurisprudence. This theory attempts to
state in some intelligible way all the possible variations of legal relation-
ships through a system of word symbols. It is not entirely clear what
use the theory would have even were it to achieve what it attempted.
In any event, the analytical method sets out to explain the differences
and relationships between liberties, rights, duties, powers, and so forth.
Its fundamental assumption is the possibility of thinking about legal
relations without regard to legal processes or social purpose: that it is
possible to describe legal relations as they exist prior to any conflict
between parties.9 3 It seems to me that this assumption exhibits an
internal inconsistency. Any attempt to describe the legal relations of
experience and not as an object of human striving." McDougal, Law as a Process of
Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 NATURAL L. F. 53, 58
(1956) : "Fourthly, one may seek to clarify community policies with respect to deci-
sions and to state what future decisions should be. Such clarification may include both
the description of the policies sought by others and the recommendation of one's own
specific preference as disciplined by knowledge of context." See also Watson v. City
of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1962) ; Brief for the Government at 186, Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
191 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
192 In this respect the necessity for judicial choice of remedy is not different in
principle from the necessity for choice of the applicable substantive rule of decision.
In both instances a value choice, not a "neutral principle," decides the question. See
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Coastitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 1
S1959) ; cf. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951) ; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
1949); W. FRIDmmANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocIETY 47-48 (1959): "But if, as
Professor Wechsler concedes, a value choice is inevitable and the Court should not be
strictly bound by precedent, a 'principled' approach can mean little more than that
the conflict of values should be frankly articulated and that the Court should not simply
be guided by its preference in the case before it, but by consistency of reasoning."
193 See D. LLoYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 313 (1964). The effort to describe legal
relations prior to any conflict contradicts both Llewellyn's position that doing some-
thing about disputes is the business of law, and Lon Fuller's argument that law so
conceived is at best a dangerous clich6. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3
NATURAL L.F. 83, 103 (1958). See also H. KELSEN, WHrAT is JUsTICE? 4 (1957);
McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervention, 50 YALE L.J.
827, 834-38 (1941).
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parties prior to any formal action by the legal process can amount to
nothing more than argument in favor of that which is being described.
Even if these legal relations are assumed to have been settled by prior
adjudication factual identity itself is an assumption, a decision. The
analytical view is not made consistent by the argument that, because the
assertion of claims may be barred by mere procedural rules, it is valid
to symbolically describe the substantive relationship of the parties in
their out-of-court situation.' A contract that is void because its
purpose is contrary to public policy may in fact be performed, as may a
contract barred from enforcement by the statute of frauds. For what
it is worth, the parties may behave in precisely the same fashion with-
out having made a contract at all. In all three situations the out-of-
court legal position can only be meaningfully described by reference to
the view the legal process will take, or has taken, of the specific relation-
ship. That view will ultimately depend on an applied conception of
social purpose: whether the legal process will see the connection between
the parties' relationship and some existing rule, principle or policy.'
95
My criticism embodies what has been termed the "extreme sanc-
tionist" position. 96 Nevertheless, the incoherence and uselessness of
the analytical method remain. And even that system has been unable to
avoid dependence on the remedial process. In my view, the attempt to
distinguish "primary" from "secondary" or "remedial" rights has been
no more successful than the attempt to make sense out of the maxim
ubi jus ibi remedium.97  In the Hohfeldian system, the terms "right"
and "duty" are confined to those relationships which relate to the
remedial process. They are secondary rights and duties. Real,
primary relationships are described by the symbol "liberty-no right."
Glanvill Williams' attempt to define "liberty" "'8 did little more than
distinguish between law and "no law." Where a right is something
about which the law has something to say, a liberty is something about
which the law has nothing to say-it is a negative legal relation.3'1
194 D. LLOYD, supra note 193, at 313. Cf. Bator, supra note 107, at 449. Professor
Bator notes that in dealing with constitutional rights "it is easy to slip into the assump-
tion that the right has a kind of ultimate reality or existence apart from the institu-
tional processes which we create to determine whether the right has been violated in
a particular case." Cf. D. LouisELL & G. HAZARD, CASES ON PLEADING AND PRO-
CEDURE-STATE AND FEDERAL 1275-76 (1962).
15 See E. LEvi, AN INTRODuCrION TO LEGAL REASONING 60, 76 (1961).
196 D. LLOYD, TuE IDEA OF LAw 317 (1964).
19 7 See notes 83-85 mtpra and accompanying text.
198 Williams, The Coiwept of a Legal Liberty, 56 COLUm. L. Rxr. 1129 (1956).
199 Id. at 1142. Williams' definition of a legal liberty is another way of saying
that a certain act is lawful because it is not unlawful. While the statement may be true
(and all tautologies are) it fails to distinguish those acts that are legal because not
illegal and those that are legal because they may not be made illegal by any act of
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Williams contradicts his own assertion when he explains the difference
between the statement "I have a liberty to do this," and the statement
"I have a right not to be interfered with in doing this." He says:
The first means that I do not not commit a tort or other legal
wrong by doing so-and-so. The second means that you com-
mit a tort or other legal wrong by interfering with my doing
so-and-so. These are different statements.
200
While granting that these are different statements, I am totally unable
to appreciate why they are significantly so. Williams' inability to ex-
plain the meaning of the first statement without reference to the law of
tort points up what Myres Mv[cDougal has labelled "normative-am-
biguity." 201 Does the plaintiff have a right to be free to do something
because the defendant has a duty not to stop him, or does the defendant
have a duty because the plaintiff has a liberty? Does the plaintiff have
a property right because he won the case or did he win the case because
he had a property right? Did Mr. Frank lose his case because he had
no protectable interest in liberty or does he have no protectable interest
202Oncolin liberty because he lost his case. One could go on indefinitely. The
simple conceptual point is that where a principle induced from the past
is not broad enough to cover the immediate situation it cannot control
the choice to be made. Where it is broad enough to cover the imme-
diate case it assumes the choice to be made.20 3  The broadening and
narrowing of induced principles is a method of advocacy, not a descrip-
tion of a legal process that has its eye on social purposes.
It is my belief that the enterprise of analytical jurisprudence was
the outgrowth of remedial irrationality. The concern of courts with
rules of actionability rather than with the existence of primary duties
created a manifestly incoherent process in which primary duties became
positive law. An act of positive law, in this context, may be invalid whether it is
formally regular or irregular. Williams' definition fails to distinguish a "legal liberty,"
as he uses the term, from a defined and protected interest in liberty as I have been
employing that phrase. One cannot call activities included within the latter legal
because not illegal. To do so would ignore the distinction between the "liberty" of
speech and the "liberty" of two unmarried persons of different sex to have sexual
relations in the absence of a fornication statute.
20oId. at 1143.
2 0McDougal, supra note 190, at 59.
202 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). But see Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
203 McDougal, supra note 190, at 63. "No decision is deduced from any other,
although obviously, some decisions under appropriate circumstances sustain or inhibit
others. Even if some uniform way existed of fixing upon the principle or ratio
decidendi of every case, the decision to apply that ratio to some other case, the ratio
of which that ratio was held to 'subsume,' would itself constitute a decision."
M. KADIsH, REASON AND CONTROVERSY IN THE ARTS 242 (1968).
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dependent on the remedial system. 04 The much deprecated forms of
action rule from the grave; the tail wags the dog.
One further aspect of analytical thought merits particular attention.
At one point in his writing Corwin stated: "It was also clear that the
scope of judicial supervision of political power in our system has been
greatly enlarged by the assumption that private interests are legally
entitled to the immunities arising from mere defect of power in this,
that, or other instrument of government." 205 H. L. A. Hart made
reference to this "defect of power" in discussing the distinction between
primary duties directed to human activities, and secondary rules which
provide that people may, by doing certain things, work changes in the
primary rules. According to Hart, primary rules impose duties while
secondary rules confer powers. 06 An effective constitution, he says,
does not impose a duty upon legislators not to act in a certain way, but
confers upon them powers the exercise of which shall be void if not
consistent with the grant of power.207
I am quite willing to accept this description because it does not
require the conclusion that people have no interest in freedom from
enactments that are the product of a defective exercise of power. The
only conclusion which necessarily follows is that where granted powers
are restricted, some method must be made available to enforce the re-
strictions. As to legislation, the ability to raise the issue of defective
authority, coupled with the judicial power to declare such measures
void, is an adequate way of enforcing the restrictions on power. The
204 H. HART & A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 500 (tent. ed. 1958). "If the new
remedial doctrine serves to simply reinforce and make more effectual well-understood
primary obligations, the net result of innovation may be to strengthen rather than to
disturb the general sense of security." Id. at 577; cf. Silberg, Law and Morals in
Jewish Jurisprudence, 75 HARv. L. Rxv. 306, 328 (1961).
205 Corwin, Constitution v. Constitutional Theory, supra note 190, at 291.
206 H. L. A. HART, THE CoNcEP OF LAw 78-79 (1961). Professor Hart's ex-
pressions here are difficult to reconcile with his "new approach" to analytical juris-
prudence. "The technique I suggested was to forego the useless project of asking
what the words taken alone stood for or meant and substitute for this a characteriza-
tion of the function that such words performed when used in the operation of a legal
system." Hart, Analytical Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to
Professor Bodenheiiner, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 961 (1957). In any event, I fail to
see how a functional description is significantly different from a catalog of rhetoric.
207 H. L. A. HART, supra note 206, at 68. For an indication of the significance
of this discussion see text accompanying note 394 infra. Madison's view of the func-
tion of the Bill of Rights does not provide evidence for the analytical method. His
style strongly suggests he saw the provisions as defining private interests. "If [the
first ten amendments] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative
or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights ex-
pressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights." 1 ANNALS Or
CoNG. 439 (1789). See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 506 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941) (A. Ham-
ilton): "The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the




same may not be true with regard to completed executive action. De-
claring such action void is insignificant at best.2 ° In any case, the
narrow argument being made here is simply that the ability to void
legislation arising from a defect in power is a chosen remedy. It is
not necessarily chosen by the analytical argument that restrictions on
legislative power imply the absence of a power rather than the presence
of a duty. Enjoining enactments that would violate restrictions on
granted powers would be no less consistent or coherent. 9
B. Interests in Liberty and Remedial Methodology
The argument that the Constitution, as law in courts, ought to be
treated as any other body of legal rules should not prove disconcerting.
The claim can only mean that legal methodology otherwise applicable is
equally valid where the interests are constitutional ones. Sound legal
method will, of course, account for the seriousness of constitutional
questions and their broad political impact.
The most significant objection to ordinary legal method in consti-
tutional cases is the recognition that judges must weigh competing
interests, 2 10 and in doing so are without any clear guides to choice. 11
If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest
outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his
knowledge just as the legislator gets it, from experience and
study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here, indeed,
is the point of contact between the legislator's work and his.212
In constitutional adjudication the judge becomes more than legislator-
he becomes the voice of the body politic. Since courts are necessary
208 The application of the exclusionary rule to bar the introduction of evidence
obtained by methods that violate constitutional interests in liberty can be seen as a
species of the "voiding" power. Where some affirmative governmental action, such
as a criminal prosecution, follows the gathering of such evidence, the exclusionary rule
operates to set at naught the use of "defective power." But the situation is quite
different where a prosecution does not follow.
2 09 See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964)
(action to enjoin the functioning of a malapportioned state legislature).
21o See Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARv. L. REv. 343 (1915). Pound's
notion of the independent existence of interests that are merely recognized but not
created by law has been strongly attacked by A. LUNDSTEDT, LEGAL. THINKING RE-
visED 342-70 (1956). See also Fried, supra note 39; text accompanying note 193 spra.
For an analysis on a somewhat broader level, see B. DE JoUvENEL ON SOVEREIGNTY
153-57 (1957). However, the Pound view has apparently prevailed with the American
Law Institute. See note 39 supra.
2 11 KELsEN, supra note 193, at 4, 125-28. Kelsen concludes that only positive law
can select the just criteria in the distinction of legal incidents among people. The
Aristotelian principle that the relative value of the two persons to whom they are
distributed does not answer the question of relevant criteria. Cf. B. DE JoUVENEL,
supra note 210.
212B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921). See also
E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE (1962); Amsterdam, Book Review, 63
CoLum. L. REv. 1152, 1159 (1963).
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for the implementation of designated interests, it is necessary that their
activity be made rational and therefore justifiable by the use of a sound
method.
Where a court is faced with the question whether a right to dam-
ages should lie for invasion of a protected interest in liberty, it may
inquire into the following considerations of policy: how serious is the
injury to the particular plaintiff? to what extent does the conduct
threaten harm to others similarly situated? to what extent can workable
standards of adjudication be formulated? what is the social interest in
permitting the conduct complained of? what burden will be imposed by
this kind of judicial intervention in similar cases in the future? to what
extent will this kind of judicial intervention interfere with other socially
recognized values? 213 The treatment of the Constitution as "ordinary
law," in the sense that this methodology applies, does not pose any
serious threat to the political structure. The method accounts not only
for the interests in liberty and the needs of government, but also for
the proper role of the judiciary as an institution with its own limita-
tions.2 "14 The method itself all but explicitly defines the function of an
adversary process. It provides an additional safeguard in its ame-
nability to the construction of a written opinion.215 The possibility of a
wrong decision must be viewed in conjunction with the need for the
security of a final judgment. 16 If I am correct in this view, a position
that would not accord ordinary legal treatment to constitutional in-
terests in liberty must rest upon a rather cynical opinion of judicial
personnel. Such a position, I can only assert, is neither justified nor
realistically persuasive.2"
If the Constitution is law because it is susceptible to adjudication,
it must follow that its substance cannot be understood apart from the
institutions which administer it. When the institution is a court, one
observable phenomenon of that institution is that its judgments neces-
sitate the application of something that can properly be called a remedy.
This perception is not trivial: if the implementation of interests in
liberty defined by the Constitution is conditioned upon the existence of
an institution capable of authoritative action, it is likewise conditioned
by the internal rules of the institution. Rules such as those requiring
213 See Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Asso-
ciations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983, 990 (1963) [hereafter cited as Associations].
214 See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme
Courts Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. REv. 755 passim (1963).
215See Associations 1005.
216 See Bator, Finality in. Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HAgv. L. REv. 441, 483 (1963).
21See id. at 511; TnE: FEa.mAmisT No. 81 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941) (A. Hamilton).
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a case or controversy, or limiting the court's authority to apply certain
remedies, condition the exercise of judicial power. Such limitations
will be decisive in any attempt to obtain authoritative implementation
of constitutional interests in liberty. Let the remedial process be inade-
quate or unjust and the meaning of judicial review ceases to be clear.2 1
If it is accepted that the Constitution is law because justiciable, an in-
adequate remedial system defeats the goals inherent in the premise. In
the extreme situation, the interests in liberty set forth in a written
document which declares itself to be the supreme law are reduced to
nothing more than "statements of tradition." 219
It is because remedial implementation of constitutional interests
in liberty determines their reality that judicial concern with the effect
of a decision must be more intense. Remedial implementation is uni-
versally meaningful because the class of persons who are the holders
of these interests is coextensive with the political society. So far as the
judgment must run, in the context of our present discussion, against
government agents, remedial implementation may tend to deter govern-
mental activity having aspects of conceded benefit. Moreover, the
notion of adjudication by definition includes within its scope of author-
ity the principle of finality.' °  In the case of remedial implementation
of constitutional interests, finality works to exclude all non-judicial
institutions."'
The question whether a given remedy shall be granted to redress
a constitutionally defined interest in liberty, while posing an important
issue, is not the most delicate constitutional task courts must face.
Refusing to give judgment for the plaintiff in such a case does not
mean the legislature would be incapable of providing a remedy. Nor
does awarding the remedy necessarily mean the legislature could not
remove it from future cases. Judgment for the defendant does not
always imply judicial approval of the defendant's activities.2" Indeed,
218 See e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ; Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 235, 250 (1845).
219 See Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of hustice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 107
(A. Sutherland ed. 1956). "The creation of a remedial framework to ensure effective
implementation of [the fourteenth amendment] is, therefore, one of the important tasks
of our system." Bator, supra note 216, at 446.
22 o Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 191 (1830). See also 2 J. STORY, CoM-
MENTARY ON THE CONSITUTION, § 1837 (4th ed. 1873).
221 Whether an exception to this statement can be found in legislative power to
control the remedial jurisdiction of courts is discussed at notes 233-35 infra and ac-
companying text. Otherwise, where a particular remedy is found constitutionally neces-
sary no legislature or executive is empowered to alter implementation in future cases.
Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
657 (1961). See also E. CORWIN, AmmEucAx CoNSTnrUTIONAL HISTORY 10 (1964);
Corwin, Judicial Review in Action, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 651-52 (1926).
Professor Bickel has taken a contrary view with regard to judicial approval
of the constitutionality of statutes. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term--Fore-
word: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 48 (1961).
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the judgment might express disapproval or admit illegality but decline
a remedy for other reasons, as in Bell v. Hood. However, judgment
for the plaintiff can place a burden on the Executive as a consequence
of its invasion of constitutionally defined interests in liberty. One's
initial temptation is to note that interests in liberty are constitutionally
defined for that very reason. However, a rational process of decision
must determine whether there are reasons for allowing governmental
invasion of constitutionally defined interests in liberty.
The initial question-whether no remedy will ever be given to
redress these kinds of invasions-must be answered in the negative.
Judicial review, broadly cast, is itself a kind of remedy insofar as it
requires as a minimum that government justify an alleged invasion of
an interest in liberty. The power to declare legislation void is the
ordinary instance of the application of a judicial remedy. Federal
judicial power to issue injunctions 13 and writs of habeas corpus 22' in
proper cases is beyond dispute. The power to require that evidence
acquired through invasion of an interest in liberty be excluded from
consideration by a court of law is also well established. 5 But, with
regard to federal invasions of constitutional interests in liberty, that
is the extent of available federal remedies. 26 The question, then, is
not whether constitutional interests in liberty may be implemented by
the judicial application of remedial law. Rather, there are four
questions: (1) whether there is something peculiar about the Con-
stitution which precludes its implementation by a remedy in damages;
(2) whether damages would be so effective a remedy as to do violence
to other admittedly valid interests; (3) whether there is something in
the nature of judicial review itself which precludes the application of
a damage remedy; and (4) whether such a remedy is really needed
to protect the interests in question.
"[I]n laying down [constitutional] barriers against legislative
invasions of private right [the Framers] wholly omitted to provide
any positive guaranty or specific protection for them. No sanction or
penalty is attached." The omission has been filled by the judiciary in
the exercise of a power "surrendered" to it. "Nor is it less curious
to observe that this is the result of the action of the judiciary itself." 227
23 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1920). Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908).
224 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
2 2 5 See note 221 srpra.
223 Federal mandamus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), may also be of help
occasionally. State invasions of federal constitutional rights are, of course, covered by
statute. See note 129 sfpra. For a discussion of state remedies, see notes 272-315 infra
and accompanying text.
227 T. SEDGWICK, INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUcTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 405-06 (2d ed., with Pomeroy's notes, 1874).
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The situation is not curious at all. As I have tried to show in
part II, the English judiciary had for centuries been implementing
the substantive law by a remedial system that evolved through the
common law process. I do not find it strange that eightenth century
men may not have supposed there would be any difficulty of imple-
mentation so long as the Constitution was the "Supreme Law of the
Land" applicable in ordinary courts. Particularly is this understand-
able given the fact that the interests in liberty were themselves the
product of judicial development. 2
I have also tried to show in part II that there is nothing in history
to show that damages-the ordinary remedy at law-were not as
readily applied to protect interests in liberty as to protect other in-
terests, whether or not defined in a document. If there is something
peculiar about the Constitution that precludes this remedy, it has gone
without mention for almost two centuries-unless the peculiarity is
the consequence of some defect in the grant of judicial power to federal
courts. However, of the existing remedies just mentioned,229 none
was the product of specific legislation. All were judicially created
pursuant to the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by the
Constitution and the Congress.2 ° It is not correct to claim that the
federal courts derive their equitable power from the Constitution but
their jurisdiction at law from Congress. 23 ' "It was Congress after all
that vested an equity jurisdiction in federal courts." '
It is an historical anomaly that the ordinary remedy of damages
has become extraordinary. Is this because damages would be an
overly severe form of redress? I think not, and there is substantial
theoretical and practical evidence to support my view.
Herbert Wechsler has emphatically suggested that where a sub-
stantive right at issue is federal, "unless the Congress has made clear
in the particular area an intention to refer questions of remedies to
state law" the federal courts should determine and apply the governing
rule.2 3 He has also argued that, unless Congress has specifically
withdrawn a remedy, official immunity should be limited "to cases
=As the district court recognized. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 816 (S.D.
Cal. 1947).
-29 Text accompanying notes 223-26 supra.
230 "There are certain sections of the Constitution that are viewed as self-executing;
the judiciary need not await legislation in order to act under them. Where the Con-
stitution contains express negatives, as in the Bill of Rights, no other basis for judicial
creation of standards may be required." Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to
Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HxAv. L. REv. 1084, 1089 (1964).
231 The claim made in Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. at 819.
2 32Wechsler, Colmment, in GoVERNMZNT UNDER LAw 134, 138 (A. Sutherland ed.
1956).
,3 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 241 (1948).
19681
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where relief cannot be granted unless judgment runs against the United
States as such, as distinguished from its officers .... , 234 "[A]ll
district courts [should] have the authority to grant all remedies
against federal officials appropriate to the judicial power, in accordance
with the principles of law." 11
Justice Harlan, arguing that the measure of damages in cases of
invasion of interests in liberty by state officers should be based on the
"deprivation of a constitutional right" rather than a common law right,
expressed no concern that the imposition of such a remedy would
unduly burden the functioning of the state government. 36 Why the
converse might be true with regard to the federal government remains
a mystery. In Great Britain, the absence of a constitution applicable
in courts of law results in the characterization of interests in liberty
as common law rights. But regardless of the label, under English law
government officials are personally liable in damages for activities that
would, in this country, constitute invasions of the fourth or fifth
amendments. 'Y3 It does not appear that the existence of such personal
responsibility has worked any appreciable harm to the efficient func-
tion of the British executive.
IV. REMEDIAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERALISM
A. Damages as the Least Onerous Remedy
In the history of actions against federal officers, there is nothing
to suggest that the damage remedy was ever regarded as inimical to the
efficient functioning of the federal government. Since most of the early
cases were originally brought in state courts, it would seem to follow
that there is nothing in the remedy itself which would prevent its appli-
cation to federal officers in federal cases. The remedy at law, in fact,
appears to be the only one the propriety of which was never seriously
questioned. It is indeed the one generally available, with equitable
relief held to serve particular needs.
238
On the other hand, since Ableman v. Booth239 and Tarble's
Case 24o it has been clear that state process, regardless of its form, can
234 d. at 223.
2 5Id. at 222.
236 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (concurring opinion). See
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
237 H. STREET, FREEDom, ZlE INnIVIUAL AND THE LAW 13-39 (2d ed. 1967).
Blackstone reasoned that since the king could do no wrong, any injury inflicted must
be the responsibility of the agent. 1 COMMENTARIES *246; cf. Bell v. Hood, 71 F.
Supp. at 817.
28 Cf. Brest, The Federal Government's Power to Protect Negroes and Civil
Rights Workers Against Privately Inflicted Harm, 2 HARv. CIV. RiGHTs-Civ. LIB. L.
REV. 1, 29 (1966).
23o 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
240 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
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not operate to interfere with a federal function. Both cases involved
state habeas corpus presuming to act upon persons held under federal
authority. Tarble's Case, in following Ableman, refused to allow state
courts the power to determine the validity of the federal authority being
exercised. After Tarble's Case, the power of state courts would be
limited to ascertaining whether or not colorable federal authority, as
opposed to a mere pretense of authority, was being exercised. Neither
case can be read either to hold that state courts have no power over the
activities of federal officers, or to suggest that in an action for false im-
prisonment, for example, the state court would be without power to
adjudicate the question of authority to imprison under federal law.241
The general concurrent jurisdiction of state courts with respect
to federal matters was affirmed in Claflin v. Houseman.242 Claflin arose
on a claim that because federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction in
bankruptcy, an assignee in bankruptcy was without capacity to sue in
state court. But Claflin held that unless some act of Congress either
expressly or impliedly conferred exclusive jurisdiction of the matter
upon the federal courts the matter could be heard in a state tribunal. 43
The problem, however, is in drawing the line between state court
interference with federal programs and the mere exercise of remedial
power over federal officers. The early cases dealt with this problem
largely in terms of the remedy which the state court sought to apply.
That is, some remedies were considered more likely to interfere with
federal functions than others. Habeas corpus is probably the clearest
instance of a state process endangering a federal function.244
If the cases are divided into those involving equitable process,
those dealing with criminal process, and actions at law, the evidence is
conclusive that the latter were regarded as posing no danger of inter-
ference with federal functions. Research has not disclosed a single case
holding that a civil action at law will not lie against a federal officer.
The matter was not always so clear with regard to state equitable
actions. McClung v. Silliman 2 45 is commonly read as holding that state
241 Support for this conclusion is found in Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334
(1865), decided between Ablenuin and Tarble's Case. As United States Marshall,
Buck seized certain property under a federal writ of attachment. Colbath sued in
trespass for a wrongful taking. Justice Miller, for the Court, held that the state action
here would in no way interfere with the federal function. He distinguished Freeman
v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860), on the ground that the state action there was
an attempt to replevy property seized by the marshall under court order. He reasoned
that since in Buck possession was in the court the marshall would not be the proper
party, and title to the property could not be tried collaterally. But cf. Bishop, The
Jurisdiction of State and Federal Courts Over Federal Officers, 9 COLUm. L. REv. 397,
407 (1909).
242 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
24 Id. at 141-42.
244 See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 408-09 (1871).
M 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
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courts have no mandamus jurisdiction over federal officers.246 McClung
originally sued in federal circuit court, praying that the officer in charge
of the local United States Land Office be ordered to issue certain docu-
ments confirming his interest in particular parcels. The circuit court
dismissed the suit on the ground that Congress had not granted lower
federal courts the power to issue mandamus in such cases. McClung
renewed his action in the state court, which affirmed its jurisdiction
but denied relief on the merits. Justice Johnson's order at the end of
his opinion for the Supreme Court is stated in terms of the "authority"
of the state court, but it "affirms" the disposition below."" At one
point in the opinion Justice Johnson states that since mandamus power
is denied to the federal courts "the inference dearly is, that all viola-
tions of private right, resulting from acts of such officers, should be
the subject of actions for damages, or to recover the specific property
. . . in Courts of competent jurisdiction." 248 The "competent" courts
here referred to must be, as Justice Marshall said in Slocum v. May-
berry,249 state courts.
This inference arising out of the absence of federal mandamus
power, difficult to square with the structural presumption that state
courts are of general jurisdiction, does not appear to have persuaded
Justice Thompson. In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,2 50 the
plaintiff sought mandamus (in the District of Columbia) against the
Postmaster General to require the latter to pay over monies designated
for him by an Act of Congress. While Congress had not given ordi-
nary federal courts mandamus power, said Justice Thompson, the Act
of February 27, 1801,2"1 provided that in the territory ceded to the
United States by Maryland, the laws of that state were to remain in
force. Therefore, since mandamus was available under Maryland law
246See, e.g., Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37
N. E.2d 225 (1941), citing many cases. See also Arnold, The Power of State Courts
to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YAIE L.J. 1385 (1964).
247 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 605. As Judge Conway argued, dissenting in Armand
Schmoll, 286 N.Y. at 515, 27 N.E.2d at 230, the term "authority" as used by Justice
Johnson in McClung could very well mean the state could not order the federal officer
to do that which he had no power to do under substantive federal law. This reading
would reconcile the language with the affirmance of the state court judgment rendered
on the merits.
248 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 605. The common view is that until 1962 neither state
nor federal courts (except the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia) had original mandamus jurisdiction over federal officers. See Bishop, The .uris-
diction of State and Federal Courts Over Federal Officers, 9 COLUm. L. REv. 397,
399-400 (1909).
249 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817). There was no general federal question juris-
diction until 1875. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470. The absence of
such jurisdiction passed unnoticed in the citation of Slocum in Johnston v. Earle, 245
F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir. 1957).
250 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
251 Ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103.
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it was available in this case. He added: "[T] here is nothing growing
out of the official character of the party that will exempt him from this
writ, if the act to be performed is purely ministerial." 252
The amenability of federal officers to state equitable process was
affirmed with the Supreme Court's decision, in 1912, in Philadelphia
Co. v. Stimson 53  Relying on substantial authority, Justice Hughes
said that federal officers were subject to equitable restraint where they
act either unconstitutionally or without valid statutory warrant." 4 Un-
fortunately, the district court in Bell v. Hood seems to have read Stim-
son as saying that federal officers may be subjected to equitable process
because in acting either without valid authority or unconstitutionally
they lose their character as federal officers. 5 There is simply nothing
in Stimson to support such an inference;256 the Court merely noted
that
The exemption of the United States from suit does not pro-
tect its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights
of property they have wrongfully invaded. . . . And in case
of an injury threatened by his illegal action, the officer cannot
claim immunity from injunctive process. The principle has
frequently been applied with respect to state officers seeking
to enforce unconstitutional enactments. . . . And it is equally
applicable to a Federal officer acting in excess of his authority
or under an authority not validly conferred .... 17
The cases dealing with federal officers as defendants in state crimi-
nal actions are somewhat more confused than the equity cases. Never-
theless, there is no case holding that the states are without power to
apply their criminal processes to federal officers.258  In some of these
252 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 617. But see Ex parte Shockley, 17 F.2d 133 (N.D. Ohio
1926), where a state court had imprisoned a federal officer for refusal to obey a state
mandamus order. On federal habeas corpus, the district court held that even if the
officer had the power to do what the state ordered him to do, the state was without
power through mandamus or otherwise to control the exercise of official discretion.
See also Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900) ; In re Turner, 119 F. 231 (S.D.
Iowa 1902).
253 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
2
54 Id. at 620.
5 71 F. Supp. at 817.
2.56 But cf. Illinois v. Fletcher, 22 F. 776 (N.D. Ill. 1884), involving a murder
charge against a United States Marshall. A removal petition was filed pursuant to an
1871 amendment including officers enforcing franchise laws within the removal statute.
Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 2, 16 Stat. 433, 438, repealed, Act of Feb. 28, 1894, ch. 25,
§ 2, 28 Stat. 36. The petition was denied on the ground that since the marshall denied
participation in the shooting he could not have been acting under color of federal law.
Cf. Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25 (1934).
257 223 U.S. at 619-20, cited by the district court in Bell, 71 F. Supp. at 817.
258 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820), involved the punishment of
a draft delinquent by a state court martial. The Act of Congress had provided for
such punishment but had not specified the nature of the tribunal except that it be a
court martial. The opinion of Justice Bushrod Washington, so far as it was based on
a theory of concurrent jurisdiction, was approved in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130
(1876).
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cases the problem is clouded by the existence of a federal substantive
rule potentially governing the activities of the officer; 29 in others by
doubt whether the state court applied state or federal law to determine
whether the defendant was acting within the scope of his authority; 26
and in others by the possibility that the state rule itself was inconsistent
with the administration of some federal program.261
By far the most persuasive evidence that damage actions are not
inimical to the efficient functioning of the federal government is the
number of Supreme Court cases allowing such actions in state courts.
Since before McClung actions in trover 2 0 or to replevy goods 26  had
been brought against federal officers.264 It is true that in some cases
-59 See, e.g., In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890) ; In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889).
260 In re Waite, 81 F. 359 (N.D. Iowa 1897), involved a federal officer charged
with authority to investigate frauds in the pension system. In the course of his investi-
gation Waite attempted to draw a written statement from a pension applicant to the
effect that one of his letters of application was fraudulent Waite was convicted in
the Iowa court for maliciously attempting to compel a person to do an act against his
will by threatening accusation of a crime. The district court on habeas corpus held
the state court to be without jurisdiction to apply its criminal law to an officer charged
with federal authority. It conceded state power over officers acting in matters un-
related to their authority, but held that the question whether the bounds of authority
were overstepped was one of federal law, and that such was not the case here. While
the district court uses language of jurisdiction, it should be settled after Claflin v.
Houseman that (subject to a right to remove, or habeas corpus) the state court was
competent to adjudicate the matter and apply federal law to the question of over-
reaching.
261E.g., Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899). Thomas, as governor of the
Federal Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, was convicted by Ohio for failing to
display a 10" by 14" sign stating: "Oleomargarine Sold Here." The Home was con-
structed on land that the state had ceded to the federal government, but the United
States had ceded back jurisdiction over the territory with the proviso that the cession
back should not be construed to impair the powers of the Home's board of managers.
In Mallory v. Wheeler, 151 Wis. 136, 138 N.W. 97 (1912), the governor of a
similar Home was ordered to appear and submit to examination by the administrator
of the estate of one who had lived in the Home prior to his death. The state supreme
court upheld the order, distinguishing Ohio v. Thomas on the ground that here the act
required of Wheeler would in no way interfere with his duties, the management of
the Home or any federal rule or regulations. Cf. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51
(1920) (mail truck driver arrested for failure to obtain a Maryland driver's license);
Brief for Petitioner at 41 n.53, Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941).
2 6 2 Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94 (1814).
2 Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817).
M Damage actions against federal officials were regularly brought in state courts
(alleging some species of common law tort), and defendants frequently attempted to
bring the case into a federal court. The early removal statutes, however, granted
federal officers no general right to removal. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 267
(1879). Consequently, some courts were allowing removal under the predecessor of
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964), arguing that the defendant was acting under color of federal
law, and that it followed that his authority to act-a federal question-was central to
the disposition of the case. But the cases are often murky. For example, on their
facts, Bock v. Perkins, 139 U.S. 628 (1891), and Walker v. Collins, 167 U.S. 57
(1897), are identical. Both were trespass actions against federal marshalls for wrong-
ful taking of goods under writs of attachment.
In Bock, "arising under" removal was sustained since the case turned on the
question whether the marshall rightfully executed a lawful order of a federal court.
Walker is directly contrary. However, I think a careful examination of Justice White's
opinion in that case makes it clear that his decision is based on insufficient allegations
in the original complaint. It is unlikely that the Court intended to reverse Bock,
decided 6 years earlier, without even citing it. Bock in turn rested its reasoning on
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the right of action was denied on the basis of some federal authority
justifying the defendant's actions.2 65 But that, of course, is always a
matter of substantive defense. The district court in Bell confused the
question of federal authority with the question of governmental im-
munity. The distinction between these two issues was definitively clari-
fied in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.,266 decided a
few years after Bell. In Larson, the corporation sued in federal court
to enjoin the head of the War Assets Administration from selling coal
to another on the ground that title to the coal was in the plaintiff under
its contract with the W. A. A. The Supreme Court held that, if the
actions of federal officers create personal liability, the mere fact of their
office will not bar an action against them; personal liability arises where
the officer exercises power beyond the limits imposed by the definition
of his authority or where his authority or its exercise is unconstitu-
tional.267 However, if the remedy to be applied requires official action
it constitutes relief running directly against the government, which may
not be had in the absence of the government's consent to be sued. Up
to this point the Court was unanimous. The Justices split on that part
of Chief Justice Vinson's opinion holding the mere commission of a tort
insufficient to create personal liability. Justices Frankfurter and Burton,
dissenting, would have recognized personal liability in such instances
Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1865), discussed supra note 241. Other cases
upholding "arising under" removal in actions involving federal officers are: Sonnen-
theil v. Christian Moerlein Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401 (1899) ; Rury v. Gandy, 12 F.2d
620 (E.D. Wash. 1926) ; Nationwide Charters & Conventions Inc. v. Garber, 254 F.
Supp. 85 (D. Mass. 1966); Bradford v. Harding, 108 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1952);
Eighmy v. Poucher, 83 F. 855 (N.D.N.Y. 1898).
Other courts disagreed on Mottley grounds (Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)): Mayo v. Dockery, 108 F. 897 (E.D. N.C. 1901);
People's United States Bank v. Goodwin, 160 F. 727 (E.D. Mo. 1908); Thompson v.
Standard Oil of N.J., 60 F.2d 162 (E.D. S.C. 1931) (upholding jurisdiction), revd,
67 F.2d 644 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 631 (1933). The circuit court in Thomp-
son distinguished Bock and disapproved of Rury v. Gandy insofar as it said federal
question jurisdiction was present whenever the acts complained of were performed by
a federal officer in the course of a federal proceeding. Judge Parker dissented.
2 65 In Harris v. Dennie, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 292 (1830), an attaching creditor sought
trover against a federal marshall for his subsequent attachment of the goods. Justice
Story, speaking for the Court, reversed the state court award on the ground that, as a
matter of federal law, the prior attachment was unlawful and therefore void. There is
no indication in the case that Story doubted the power of the state court to proceed in
trover. Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1851), was also an action in trover,
to recover the value of a newspaper the postmaster refused to deliver because a written
message was inscribed thereon in fraud of the postal rates. Speaking through Justice
Wayne, the Court affirmed the state court's award on the merits, holding that the
existence of a single letter or initial on the newspaper was not the kind of memorandum
or message contemplated by the act. It is interesting that Teal's claim that he was
exercising the discretion allowed him by federal law was rejected. Justice Wayne
held that since the postmaster had exceeded his authority, he could not assert that
authority in defense, and that in the absence of contrary congressional intent the case
was properly before any court having jurisdiction in trover.
266 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
267 Presumably, this broad statement is qualified by Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967).
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save where relief ran against the government.268
In thus affirming Stinson, the Court in Larson clarified two im-
portant points: first, since a judgment in damages does not require
official action there is no question of judicial power to grant such re-
lief. 69 Second, even injunctive relief is not automatically barred as
relief requiring official action. Where an injunction is requested to
remedy unconstitutional activity, the test is whether relief can be had
merely by ordering cessation of the unconstitutional conduct. If not,
the injunction must be denied.270
Emerging from this doctrinal labyrinth is the clear proposition
that there is no barrier in theory, policy, or law to the assertion of a
claim for damages arising out of the unconstitutional activities of fed-
eral officers.27 Indeed, the refusal of the majority in Larson to extend
2 68 The classic instances of relief -running against the government are property
cases. In Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433 (1878), the petitioner attempted to assert
prior successful judgments (obtained in state ejectment actions against federal officers
in possession of the lands subject to the present dispute) by way of defense to a quiet
title action brought by the United States. Justice Bradley had no trouble disposing
of the ejectment judgments as of no effect. Once the state court determined that
possession was in the government, he said, state jurisdiction in ejectment terminated.
Cf. Gallatin v. Sherman, 77 F. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1896), an action in ejectment by the
landlord against the collector for the Internal Revenue Service to recover premises
used as a bonded warehouse. The district court's determination that the action was
removable was probably incorrect so long as state court disability in ejectment against
the government is considered jurisdictional. See also Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 450 (1860).
2 377 U.S. at 687.
WO 377 U.S. at 691 n.11. See Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941), where the
problem of state injunctive process was argued but not decided. Brief for Petitioner at
35-42.
271 Along with Stimon, the district court in Bell cited Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82
(1937), and Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947). In Ickes, the Supreme Court up-
held on the authority of Stimson an action to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from
allegedly threatening to deprive the plaintiffs of vested property rights. The question
whether the plaintiffs would have had a cause of action if the Secretary had deprived
the plaintiffs of their property rights was answered in the affirmative in Laird. That
case involved an action to restrain members of the Maritime Commission from selling
certain stock of which, it was alleged, they were unlawfully possessed; and praying
the stock be returned. In upholding the jurisdiction of the federal district court,
Justice Douglas said:
But public officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding the limits of their
authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or
chattels, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity, he is not rele-
gated to the Court of Claims to recover a money judgment The dominant
interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the victim who may bring his
possessory action to reclaim that which is wrongfully withheld.
It is in the latter catgory that the pleadings have cast this case. That is
to say, if the allegations of the petition are true, the shares of stock never
were property of the United States and are being wrongfully withheld by
petitioners who acted in excess of their authority as public officers. If owner-
ship of the shares is in the United States, suit to recover them would of course
be a suit against the United States. But if it is decided on the merits either
that the contract was illegal or that respondents are pledgors, they are entitled
to possession of the shares as against petitioners, though, as we have said,
the judgment would not be res judicata against the United States.
330 U.S. at 738-39. Thus, Land v. Dollar does not support the district court in Bell;
it strongly suggests the contrary. In remedial language, the action in Land was in
replevin. No reason appears why plaintiffs could not have chosen trover, detinue or
some other common law form.
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the liability of federal officers to all cases in which a mere tort is alleged
has the reciprocal significance of allowing liability to be imposed only
where the federal officers have acted contrary to statute or unconsti-
tutionally . In other words, their liability is confined to violations of
federal law.
B. Constitutional Interests as Dependent on State Rules
of Accountability
It is more than probable that cases like Bell v. Hood-that is,
those alleging that a federal officer has violated constitutionally defined
interests in liberty-will be heard in a federal forum.2 7 2 Therefore,
the only choice of federal policy necessary is one of substantive law;
there is no problem of choice of forum.
In the absence of a federally created damage remedy, there remain
three possible avenues through which plaintiffs may obtain a remedy.
First, the federal interest may be "enforced" by state rules making
actionable the violation of interests defined by state law that occurs
simultaneously with the violation of the federal interest.2 73 Second,
the federal interest may be enforced by state rules that include the
federal interest within a broader category of interests made actionable
by state law. Third, the federal interest may be enforced by "borrow-
ing" those state rules of actionability that include the federal interest
as a matter of state law.
1. Professor Caleb Foote has amply demonstrated that the barriers
erected by the vicissitudes of state tort law are such that affirmative
civil actions are seldom instituted, and that when they are, anything
even approaching success is rare. 74 Professor Foote was concerned
largely with the unconstitutional activities of state officers. Since the
publication of his paper, the decision in Monroe v. Pape 275 has supplied
a more adequate federal corrective process with regard to state officers.
But Foote's arguments are, unfortunately, still applicable with equal
force to federal officers.
27228 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1442a (1964), would allow removal of virtually all such
suits.
273E.g., Krehbiel v. Henlde, 142 Iowa 677, 121 N.W. 378 (1909), 152 Iowa 604,
129 N.W. 945 (1911) (trespass for unlawful search) ; McClung v. Benton, 123 Iowa
368, 98 N.W. 881 (1904) (same); McMahan's Adm'x v. Draffen, 47 S.W.2d 716
(Ky. 1932) (state officers liable for search unreasonable under state constitution);
Shall v. Minneapolis, St.P.&S.S.M. Ry., 156 Wis. 195, 145 N.W. 649 (1914) (trespass
for unlawful search; $1 damages awarded).
274 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINx. L.
REv. 493 (1955).
275 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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The decisions in both Monroe v. Pape and Mapp v. Ohio 271 were
predicated on the insufficiency of existing corrective processes supplied
by state tort law making actionable the violation of state interests con-
currently with constitutional ones.277 Professor Foote suggests that
tort claims making actionable the violation of constitutional interests-a
federal claim-would supply a more adequate remedy. 78 The presence
of a federal claim would permit federal supervision of ancillary reme-
dial matters, such as the measure of damages or the requirements of
fault,279 with a view toward the protection of the specific constitutional
interests involved.
2. If the existing state corrective processes, making actionable only
state interests violated concurrently with the federal interests, are in-
adequate as a matter of federal law, in the absence of an adequate fed-
eral remedy due process may require that the states make actionable
the specific violation of constitutionally protected interests in liberty.80
The due process argument involves the assertion that, without either a
federal or an adequate state remedy, the conduct of the federal officials
is essentially unreviewable. The proposition that some adequate avenue
of judicial review must be available in this context rests fundamentally
on Crowell v. Benson."5'
Crowell involved an award by a deputy commissioner of the United
States Employees' Compensation Commission under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act.2"2 The constitutional
validity of the award depended on a finding that congressional power
over maritime matters could extend to the facts of this case. The
premise of Chief Justice Hughes' opinion was that Congress could
not remove from the scope of judicial review, by imposing finality
on administrative findings, the determination of factual matters upon
which the constitutionality of the governmental action depended.2
On the basis of this premise, a distinction has been drawn between
cases in which certain matters are removed from consideration by
courts employed by the government to enforce its coercive measures,
276Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
277 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) ; id. at 196 n.5 (Harlan, J., con-
curring) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1961).
2 7
8 Foote, mtpra note 274, at 511-13.
279 Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
2 Cf. Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948) ; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v.
Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) ; Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
238 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
282 Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424.
2 285 U.S. at 49-50.
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and those in which judicial jurisdiction itself is withheld.2 4 In other
words, the principle of Crowell is that although the jurisdiction of
article III courts may be limited, it may not be so limited as to permit
unconstitutional decisions. But does it follow that judicial review of
the constitutionality of all extrajudicial coercion may be withheld con-
sistent with due process?
I do not think Crowell can be read to allow this limitation.2 5  The
claim there addressed itself to the constitutional legality of the admin-
istrative process and the execution of its judgment. justice Hughes
was saying that, while there is nothing inherently illegal about an ad-
ministrative determination, due process requires some adequate judicial
review prior to enforcement. It then follows that the execution of
official action without even prior administrative hearing requires at
least equal availability of review as a matter of due process. Justice
Brandeis, in dissent, agreed that under some circumstances the consti-
tutional requirement of due process means judicial process. He thus
affirmed the careful relationship between the fifth amendment and article
III. Brandeis' disagreement with the majority rested solely on the
extent to which due process requires a trial de novo of facts that
formed the basis of the governmental action in situations in which these
facts had been determined by an administrative tribunal.28  His lan-
guage in a later case bears repeating:
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be an oppor-
tunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule
of law was applied; and whether the proceeding in which facts
were adjudicated was conducted regularly. To that extent,
the person asserting a right, whatever its source, should be
entitled to the independent judgment of a court on the ulti-
mate question of constitutionality.
2 87
The conclusion is inescapable that coercive governmental activity
not preceded by either administrative or judicial determination of its
284 H. M. HART & H. WECESLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL Sys-
312-40 (1953).
285 Assuming that Hart and Wechsler are correct in asserting that Crowell could
have been otherwise decided if the administrative decision had been against the claim-
ant, the authors nevertheless recognize that the proposition is inapplicable to cases of
extra-judicial governmental coercive orders. Le., at the very least, Switchmen's Union
v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943), must be distinguishable from Ng Fung
Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
Two further distinctions from the Bell situation should be noted. First, in these
cases the plaintiff has at least had the opportunity to raise his federal claims in an
administrative proceeding, something obviously not true in Bell. Second, unlike
Crowell, the plaintiff in Bell was asserting a constitutional rather than a statutory
interest.
286285 U.S. at 88-93 (dissenting opinion).
287 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (con-
curring opinion).
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constitutionality, and for which there is no subsequent procedure readily
available and adequate to the task, is not consistent with due process.288
If the federal courts insist on refusing to make available a remedy in
damages, it is necessary to require the states to make available remedies
which are designed to protect federal constitutional interests in
liberty. 89
It is consistent both with the federal structure and the require-
ments of due process that states in some situations be required to afford
certain kinds of relief. In General Oil Co. v. Crain,' ° the Tennessee
court declined jurisdiction in a suit to enjoin the activities of a state
officer on grounds of unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court held
that the state could not constitutionally deny relief for a federal right.
But for Ex parte Young,"' decided the same day, Crain would have
been a clear application of the principles of Crowell. In Young, the
Supreme Court affirmed, on facts similar to Crain, the existence of a
right to a similar remedy in federal court. But in the presence of an
avenue of relief in the federal courts why does Crain require jurisdic-
tion in the state courts?
The answer lies in the principles of Testa v. Katt. 2 There, a
state court enforced the substantive interests created by the Emergency
Price Control Act but refused to apply the federal remedy on the basis
of state policy. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Black, the
Court held that federal policy must prevail as to federal rights, any
inconsistent state policy to the contrary notwithstanding. Under this
clear supremacy clause argument, Crain makes a bit more sense. Even
if there were a Tennessee policy against granting injunctive relief
against state officers on any ground, that policy would have to yield to
a federal policy requiring such relief in constitutional cases."9 3
28 On May 28, 1968, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California held that § 460(b) (3) of the Selective Service Act was unconstitutional
in that it prohibited review of selective service classifications otherwise than in criminal
proceedings arising out of a refusal to report for induction or through habeas corpus
proceedings. "The court concludes the Congress cannot make selective service induc-
tion orders unreviewable. Due process is offended by an administrative order which
demands compliance or a term of imprisonment." Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700,
708 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
289 "It being the right of a party to be protected against a law which violates a
constitutional right, whether by its terms or the manner of its enforcement, it is
manifest that a decision which denies such protection gives effect to the law, and the
decision is reviewable by this court." General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 228
(1908). Cf. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARv. L. Rxv. 40 (1961).
290 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
2D209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2 92 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
293 On any reading, Crain is a less drastic exercise of federal power than Iowa-
Des Moines Nat'1 Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931). In the latter case, the plain-
tiff had paid a valid tax rate while others similarly situated paid a lower rate. The
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The principles of discrimination on the one hand, and of the
supremacy of federal policy on the other, are therefore distinct. States
may, of course, enforce a general "door closing" policy that does not
discriminate against federal questions. 4 But they may not do so even
on a non-discriminatory basis where a conflicting federal policy must
prevail, or where state courts of general jurisdiction must be available
to hear claims as a matter of due process.
Nevertheless, it may well be asked whether, as a matter of political
and institutional wisdom, it is desirable to require the states to provide
a remedy rather than to create an adequate federal remedial process.
Sound management of the federal system would seem to point to the
latter in the absence of some significant reason for refusing to provide
federal relief.9 5
3. It would not be an adequate solution to the Bell v. Hood prob-
lem for the district court to "borrow" a state rule of actionability."9 O
This alternative to a federal cause of action is a possible one, but creates
more problems than it solves.
The "borrowing" technique is not unprecedented: it has been used,
for example, in wrongful death actions wherein the plaintiff claims
the death was caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel subject to
maritime law. 97 However, this analogy demonstrates the lack of
both need and wisdom in "borrowing" remedies from state law to
vindicate federal claims. The primary difficulty is that "borrowing"
is not a unitary notion; there are at least three possible approaches to
the method.
First,9 s even where the essential claim in the case involves federal
law, it is possible to conceive of the right to recover as being "rooted"
state remedy would collect the unpaid balance from the other corporations and thus
rectify the inequality. But the Court held that the plaintiff could neither be made to
assume the burden of instituting action to collect the arrears nor to wait until they
were collected. As a matter of federal law, he was entitled to a refund. 284 U.S. at
247. See Hart, The Relation Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REV.
489, 507 (1954).
294 Compare Douglas v. New York, N.H.&H.RR., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); Missouri
ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950), with McKnett v. St. Louis &
S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). In Douglas, a Connecticut resident sued, in a New
York state court under the F.E.L.A., a Connecticut corporation for an injury that had
occurred in Connecticut. Though the court dismissed the action on the basis of a
statute, there is some question whether it had power to entertain the suit apart from
state law. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
295 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 HAv. L. REv. 441, 492 (1963).
298 E.g., CAL CiV. CODE § 3281 (West 1946), quoted in Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp.
at 817: "Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of
another may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which
is called damages."2 9 7 See generally Hart, The Relation Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLum.
L. REv. 489, 531 (1954).
'98 This is the approach of Mr. Justice Stewart. The Tungus, 358 U.S. 588
(1959).
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in state law. From this perspective, the first question is whether the
state rule of actionability includes violation of the federal duty among
those violations which are made actionable.2 99  If so,3° ° the approach
holds, the state rule cannot deviate or vary the absorbed federal rules
defining the duty and its scope.3°1 Finally, when the federal courts
enforce the state rule of actionability (which includes within it the
violation of the federal duty) they must enforce that state rule as an
"integrated whole." 302
In my opinion this approach is unintelligible. Fundamentally, it
confuses the function of federal review of federal questions in state
cases 803 with federal "arising under" jurisdiction. °4  The Supreme
Court's opinion in Bell v. Hood "0 means that the case, as pleaded,
arises under federal law. The sense in which the case can be "rooted"
in state law requires some explanation beyond "cause of action"
rhetoric. If the claim made by the plaintiffs in Bell was truly "rooted"
in state law, then it could not in any sense "arise under" federal law, 08
despite the fact that any federal question in the case would be review-
able in the Supreme Court. In this regard, the maritime cases are
2
99Id. at 591.
300 The question whether the federal duty must be included in order to avoid un-
constitutional discrimination against federal law was not reached in Curry v. Fred
Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1966). The court held that since California in-
cluded breach of implied warranty of fitness within the term "wrongful," unseaworthi-
ness was also included within that term. 367 F.2d at 926-27. The question will be
dealt with below.
301 E.g., United New York & New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki,
358 U.S. 613, 617 (1959) ; see Curry v. Fred Olsen Line, 367 F.2d 921, 929 (9th Cir.
1966).
302The Tungus, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1958). "When admiralty adopts a State's
right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right as an integrated whole,
with whatever conditions and limitations the creating State has attached." Id. How-
ever, in Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960), Justice Stewart suggested this was
not a limitless principle: "We leave open the question whether a state wrongful death
act might contain provisions so offensive to traditional principles of maritime law that
the admiralty would decline to enforce them." 361 U.S. at 320. See Currie, The
Choice Among State Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 VAND. L. REv. 297 (1968);
cf. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
303 E.., Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942).
By seeing the situation as presenting something of an Erie problem, Justice Stewart
in The Tungus was able to avoid the responsibilities inherent in Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal
Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. PA. L. RIv. 797, 833 (1957).
304 E.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
305 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
306 "In personal injury cases then, the question of whether the case arises under
federal law is -uniforinly decided by reference to the question whether federal law gives
an express or implied cause of action, or whether federal law merely sets a standard
of conduct for a state cause of action." Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Require-
ment that a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 890, 911
(1967) (emphasis added). With all due respect to Professor Cohen, I find this state-
ment curious-particularly so in view of the fact that he does not discuss the Supreme
Court's opinion in Bell v. Hood.
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not analogous, for there are situations in which the admiralty juris-
diction is more like diversity ' than it is like federal question juris-
diction. Therefore, cases that are truly "rooted" in state law can be
heard in admiralty but, I submit, not in a court constituted to hear
federal questions.
In the second approach the right is conceived of as "rooted" in
federal law and the state rule of actionability is used as a "datum
made relevant" "' by federal law. Under this approach, the federal
forum "adopts" the state rule of actionability in order to provide a
remedy for a claim "rooted" in federal law, 09 but only if the state rule
of actionability provides a general right to recover under some (other)
body of law.31 The federal forum would be permitted, however, to
apply federal law only "to the extent not conflicting with the adopted"
state rule.3 n
The most serious criticism that can be made of this approach is
that it is pointless. If the state has no interest that demands more
respect for its rules of actionability than use as a datum, it seems
frivolous to maintain that a state rule of actionability is being applied.
On the other hand, it makes no sense to say that federal substantive
law "adopts" the state remedy, and also subject the federal substantive
rules to a test of their compatability with the adopted state remedy.
The two statements are essentially inconsistent. One cannot say the
case is "governed" by federal substantive law and also say that state
law controls in case of inconsistency.
The third approach 3 differs from the second in that it avoids
the inconsistency of the latter. Rather than adopt the individual state's
rules of actionability it looks for rules common to all states and adopts
them as the applicable federal rule.31 Under this approach, ancillary
state rules would apply only to the extent they related to "non-
essential matters." 314
This last approach has even less point than the second. It is
a poorly disguised attempt, as used in the admiralty cases, to avoid a
precedent holding that there is no remedy."15 Since there is no such
307 E.g., Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
303 Kay, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Law as Datum, 53 CAnw. L. Rxv. 47, 59
(1965).309 This is the approach of Mr. Justice Whittaker. Goett v. Union Carbide Corp.,
361 U.S. 340, 346 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
310 Id. at 346-47.
311 Id. at 347.
312 This is the view of Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring and dissenting in The
Tungus, 358 U.S. 597, 601 (1958) : "It is the federal maritime law that looks to the
state law of remedies here, not the state law that incorporates a federal standard of
care."
313 Id. at 608-09.
314 Id. at 609.
3 15 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
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barrier in precedent applicable to the Bell v. Hood situation, there is
no sound basis for failing to provide a simple and effective federal
damage remedy to protect constitutional interests in liberty.
V. A FEDERALLY CREATED REMEDY IN DAMAGES
The federal judiciary has long considered itself free to fashion
federal rules for decision where both the necessity for such rules and
their importance in connection with a specific national interest has
been clear. Once necessity and connection with an object of national
concern have been demonstrated, this ability of the federal courts to
exercise common law power is not subject to serious question. The
significance of Erie is its clarification of the factor of national concern
as one of constitutional dimension. But the wisdom, in a particular
instance, of judicial creativity is a more complex problem. It depends
in large measure on the extent to which courts can feel justified in
acting, rather than leaving the problem to the legislature.
One of the difficulties with the opinion in Swift v. Tyson "' is the
failure of Justice Story to be convincing that the rule of pre-existing
debt as sufficient consideration on negotiable paper is commercially
necessary. More important, the connection drawn between the rule
and a specific national concern is weak. The only federal concern at
all involved in the case was federal power over commerce. But at
the time Swift was decided, it was well established doctrine that the
Court would not fashion rules governing commerce in the face of
congressional silence, such silence being construed as an intention to
leave the area free of control save for state regulation of essentially
local matters.31'7
In The Osceola,"8 the Court sanctioned a seaman's recovery for
injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of his ship. The existence of
such a basis of liability, the Court said, must be founded "either upon
the general admiralty law or upon a local statute of the State." 319 But
admiralty law, not being statutory, must be "gathered from the ac-
cepted practice of courts of admiralty, both at home and abroad
)y 320 Upon an examination of this "accepted practice," the
31, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The analysis here suggested does not contradict
the statement of Professor Hart: "Federal law may also provide its own remedies,
with or without benefit of an act of Congress-the Supreme Court never having clearly
explained when and why such an act is necessary or unnecessary." Hart, mtpra note
at 523.
317See, e.g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 493 (1887),
and cases cited therein.
318 189 U.S. 158 (1903).




Court found foreign and lower federal courts granting recovery in
such cases. "We are not disposed to disturb so wholesome a doctrine
by any contrary decision of our own." 321
The admiralty label led Justice Holmes to distinguish the power
to draw on accepted maritime practice from the accepted practice in
courts of common law. In dissenting from Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen," he pointed out that maritime law is not a corpus juris, but a
"limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea." 323 He denied
the power of federal courts to apply general common law principles to
sustain new bases of recovery for maritime personnel. "The only
authority available is the common law or statutes of a State. For from
the often repeated statement that there is no common law of the United
States," 24 it is to be concluded that in the silence of Congress the
supplementary common law must be that of the states.
Mr. justice Holmes could not accept the existence of common law
customs in the federal judiciary, but could accept it if those customs
were found in maritime practice. He failed to make the connection
between common law tort principles and a national concern with the
maritime industry. Furthermore, he never explained why the Supreme
Court could not be the "articulate voice of some sovereign" 25 in mat-
ters of national concern.
On the other hand, Justice Holmes' position is defensible on the
view that Jensen (and indeed all excercises of congressional power in
admiralty) was a question of federal control over commerce. To avoid
making the same mistake as Justice Story, he could well have argued
that in the absence of congressional action, the states were free to legis-
late in matters of local concern. The issue in Jensen was whether the
state employer's liability law could be applied in maritime cases. Un-
fortunately, Justice Holmes went much further:
This court has recognized that in some cases different prin-
ciples of liability would be applied as the suit should happen
to be brought in a common-law or admiralty court.
But hitherto it has not been doubted authoritatively, so far as
I know, that even when the admiralty had a rule of its own to
which it adhered, . . . the state law, common or statute,
would prevail in the courts of the State.
3 28
321 Id. at 175.
322244 U.S. 205 (1917).
2 Id. at 220 (dissenting opinion).
3241d. at 221. But cf. FTC v. Flotill Products, Inc., 389 U.S. 179, 183-84 (1967),
holding that in the absence of contrary statutory provision, the common law rule
that "a majority of a quorum constituted of a simple majority of a collective body is
empowered to act for the body" applies to a federal agency.
= Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J,, dissenting).
326Id, at 222-23.
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A matter of potential national concern was not totally absent in
Erie. It may be supposed that, under the commerce power, Congress
could define the status of persons walking along a railroad right of way.
Congress had not done so. Could the court fashion a rule to govern
the case? Should it do so? Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court
seems to answer the first question in the negative and thereby dispose
of the second. Given the Court's abrogation of primary law making
in the area of interstate commerce, and its reading of congressional
silence as permitting state regulation of essentially local matters, Justice
Brandeis was quite right. If the problem of railroad trespassers is a
local matter, the question of connection with a national concern is
answered. It would indeed be unconstitutional not to apply state law
in such a case. On the other hand, if one accepts the proposition that
Congress could have governed the activity in Erie as a function of its
article I power, the obligation to apply state law as the rule for decision
is otherwise founded. On this hypothesis, it is necessary to ask whether
a federal rule regarding railroad trespassers is necessary to protect the
federally regulated utility from overly harsh rules of tort liability.
3 27
This principle of political concern can be, and has been, applied in
various contexts3ss That it was central to the disposition in Erie was
made clear in 1942. In D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp.,3"' the Court refused to decide whether the Klaxon
rule 330 (a federal court in an Erie case should apply the law that the
court of the state in which the federal court is sitting would apply)
applied in federal-question cases. "For we are of the view that the
liability of petitioner on the note involves decision of a federal, not a
state, question." 3' The court of appeals had applied general conflicts
principles in determining the applicable law, rather than selecting either
Missouri or Illinois choice-of-law rules. In a frequently cited concur-
ring opinion, Justice Jackson commented on the role of the common
law in federal question adjudication.
327 Professor Stason's analysis of the Erie problem in the light of recent decisions
is unsound to the extent it overemphasizes the significance of the tenth amendment and
underemphasizes the relevance of congressional power over the business of article III
courts. "Under no circumstances must federal law be applied in significant derogation
of rights created under power reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. It
follows that where such rights are involved, federal policy considerations are consti-
tutionally irrelevant." Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie
Versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL L. REwv. 377, 394 (1967) ; see Cox, The Supreme Court,
1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjidication and the Pronwtion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 99-108 (1966).
328 See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
329 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
330 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
3 315 U.S. at 456.
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The federal courts have no general common law, as in a sense
they have no general or comprehensive jurisprudence of any
kind, because many subjects of private law which bulk large
in the traditional common law are ordinarily within the
province of the states and not of the federal government. But
this is not to say that wherever we have occasion to decide a
federal question which cannot be answered from federal stat-
utes alone we may not resort to all the source materials of the
common law, or that when we have fashioned an answer it
does not become a part of the federal non-statutory or com-
mon law. . . 32
Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would
be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of
attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from
the terms of the Constitution itself."'
. . . Federal common law implements the federal Constitu-
tion and statutes, and is conditioned by them. Within these
limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional common
law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of
the common law in cases such as the present. . . .3
The law which we apply to this case consists of principles
of established credit in jurisprudence, selected by us because
they are appropriate to effectuate the policy of the governing
Act.335
It is unfair to read Justice Jackson's opinion as implying that Erie was
limited to diversity cases. 38 It would be more accurate to say that he
recognized Erie did not apply to questions primarily of national con-
cern. This, I take it, was his purpose in citing the language from Justice
Brandeis' opinion in a case 83' decided the same day as Erie:
[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be appor-
tioned between the two States is a question of 'federal com-
mon law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of
either state can be conclusive.38
The Clearfield Trust339 opinion has been so well treated else-
where 340 that I will not deal with its details here save to examine the
332 Id. at 469.
= Id. at 470.
334 Id. at 472.
335 Id.
336 Friendly, supra note 28, at 103 n.122; see Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your
Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956).337 Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
338 315 U.S. at 470; cf. Morgan, The Future of a Federal Common Law, 17 ALA.
L. REV. 10, 27 (1964).
339 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
340 Mishkin, The Variou.ness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in
the Choice of National and State Rdes for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 828-33
(1957).
19681
62 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
process of reasoning. This was the first of a series of opinions Justice
Douglas was to write on the question of federal common law. He first
established the federal concern in the case:
The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Consti-
tution and the statutes of the United States. . . The duties
imposed upon the United States and the rights acquired by it
as a result of the issuance find their roots in the same federal
sources.
4 1
He then dealt with the necessity of fashioning a federal rule and its
connection with a national concern:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on
a vast scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to
payment will commonly occur in several states. The appli-
cation of state law . . .would subject the rights and duties
of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead
to great diversity in results by making identical transactions
subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The
desirability of a uniform rule is plain 42
Professor Mishkin has doubted whether the desirability is "plain" in
this case.8  But he does not dispute the central proposition that it is
entirely within the province of the federal courts to determine, as a
matter of policy, whether varying state laws should apply, whether a
single state rule should be uniformly adopted and applied, or whether
a new rule should be created and applied as a matter of federal law.
Anderson v. Abbott 3" was an action to recover assessments from
the shareholders of a bank-stock holding company under the Federal
Reserve and National Bank Acts. Justice Douglas, for the five-man
majority, reasoned that the shareholders could no more escape liability
through the holding company form than by transfering their shares to
one legally irresponsible. "That follows because of the policy under-
lying these statutes." 14 Though Delaware limited the liability of
shareholders, and its limitation rules were enforceable under Erie, no
such statutory rule could apply to defeat federal policy 40  Justice
Jackson, for the dissenters, disagreed with the majority's reading of
the legislative policy. But assuming the latter was correct, the
majority's justification for formulating the doctrine leading to share-
341318 U.S. at 366.
342 Id. at 367.
343 Mishkin, supra note 340, at 830.





holder liability in Anderson was consistent with Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion in D'Oench Duhme:
If the judicial power is helpless to protect a legislative pro-
gram from schemes for easy avoidance, then indeed it has
become a handy implement of high finance. Judicial inter-
ference to cripple or defeat a legislative policy is one thing;
judicial interference with the plans of those whose corporate
or other devices would circumvent that policy is quite
another. Once the purpose or effect of the scheme is clear,
once the legislative policy is plain, we would indeed forsake
a great tradition to say we were helpless to fashion the
instruments for appropriate relief.
3 47
Several months later, a unanimous Court held federal question
jurisdiction proper in an action by a member against his union for
equitable and legal relief alleging failure of fair representation. 4 The
plaintiff, Tunstall, claimed that the union was discriminating in its
representation of Negroes. Both lower federal courts dismissed the
suit on the grounds that, insofar as the action was based on the wrong-
ful acts of the union, it did not "arise under" the laws of the United
States. But the Supreme Court disagreed.
We also hold that the right asserted by petitioner which is
derived from the duty imposed by the Railway Labor Act
on the Brotherhood, as bargaining representative, is a federal
right implied from the statute and the policy which it has
adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as unlaw-
ful the Brotherhood's conduct.349
The connection with an object of national concern is clear in both
these cases. As for necessity, the creation of a rule of federal law in
Anderson was needed to prevent avoidance of a federal policy. Like-
wise, in Tunstall, the creation of a federal remedy implied from a
federally created duty was necessary if the duty was to be enforced at
all, because "the petitioner is without available administrative rem-
edies." 3o In the absence of a federally created right of recovery, the
federally imposed duty would be practically unenforceable.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht,351 was a suit in federal equity to enforce
a liability created by the Federal Farm Loan Act. One of the defenses
set up in the case was the New York statute of limitations. Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Frankfurter said:
3471d. at 366-67.




351 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
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And so we have the reverse of the situation in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, supra. We do not have the duty of a
federal court, sitting as it were as a court of a State, to
approximate as closely as may be State law in order to
vindicate without discrimination a right derived solely from
a State. We have the duty of federal courts, sitting as
national courts throughout the country, to apply their own
principles in enforcing an equitable right created by Con-
gress. When Congress leaves to the federal courts the
formulation of remedial details, it can hardly expect them
to break with historic principles of equity in the enforcement
of federally-created equitable rights."'
The issue before the Court in Wolf v. Colorado 831 was whether
the exclusion in state criminal cases of unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence was necessary to implement the guarantee of the fourth
amendment. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, expressed
the element of national concern in a case of fourth amendment violation.
"But the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a
different order." 3 The Weeks exclusionary rule
was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth
Amendment; it was not based on legislation expressing Con-
gressional policy in the enforcement of the Constitution. The
decision was a matter of judicial implication.
355
The immediate question in the case was whether the right "demands"
the application of the exclusionary rule. Justice Frankfurter's failure
to recognize such a demand was due in part to his belief in the avail-
ability and efficacy of state remedies, and in part to his sense of the
justness of the defendants' claims.
Indeed, the exclusion of evidence is a remedy which directly
serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises
something incriminating has been found. We cannot, there-
fore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand
such persons, together with those who emerge scatheless
from a search, to the remedies of private action and such
protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the
eyes of an alert public opinion, may afford. 56
In an almost pleading dissent, Mr. Justice Murphy disagreed
about the necessity of a federally created remedy to enforce the con-
352 Id. at 395.
= 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
354 Id. at 28.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 30-31.
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stitutional policy. The dissenters 357 saw the only alternative to ex-
clusion as "no sanction at all." ""
But what an illusory remedy this [trespass action for
damages] is, if by "remedy" we mean a positive deterrent to
police and prosecutors tempted to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. The appealing ring softens when we recall that in a
trespass action the measure of damages is simply the extent
of the injury to physical property. If the officer searches
with care, he can avoid all but nominal damages-a penny,
or a dollar. Are punitive damages possible? Perhaps. But
a few states permit none, whatever the circumstances. In
those that do, the plaintiff must show the real ill will or
malice of the defendant, and surely it is not unreasonable to
assume that one in honest pursuit of crime bears no malice
toward the search victim. . . . Is it surprising that there is
so little in the books concerning trespass actions for violation
of the search and seizure clause? 359
Twelve years later the Court was to change its mind about the
necessity of the exclusionary rule. Mr. Justice Clark's opinion for the
majority in Mapp v. Ohio, 6" while recognizing the need for the rule,
failed to see necessity as an essential methodological factor in the
process of adjudication. Thus the following non-sequitur:
The Court's reasons [in Wolf] for not considering essential
to the right to privacy . . . that which decades before had
been posited as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's
limitation upon federal encroachment of individual privacy,
were bottomed on factual considerations.
While they are not basically relevant to a decision that
the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the Fourth
Amendment as the right it embodies is vouchsafed against
the states by the Due Process Clause, we will consider the
current validity of the factual grounds upon which Wolf
was basedY6
Justice Clark then showed that many of the states which had rejected
the Weeks rule at the time of Wolf later accepted it. He also found
weighty the determination by the California Supreme Court in People
v. Cahan,3"2 that the other means of protection cited in Wolf had
357 Justice Rutledge joined Justice Murphy's dissent, and Justice Douglas ex-
pressed his agreement with it. Id. at 40-41.
35S Id. at 41 (dissenting opinion).
359 Id. at 42-44 (citations omitted) ; cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
See also the suggestion in Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Pro-
posals for the 1970's, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 1205, 1229 (1966).
360 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
361 Id. at 650-51.
36244 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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"completely failed to secure compliance." 31 I do not see how justice
Clark's disavowal of the relevance of factual matters can be taken
seriously. As we have seen, from Clearfield Trust through and in-
cluding Wolf, just such factual matters determined whether a federal
rule protective of a national concern was to be judicially created.
Justice Douglas, who had dissented from Wolf on the ground that
absent exclusion the amendment would have no sanction,3 64 concurred
in Mapp:
Without judicial action making the exclusionary rule
applicable to the States, Wolf v. Colorado in practical effect
reduced the guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures to a "dead letter," . . . ."'
Although the decision in Mapp was consistent with the line of
cases following Clearfield Trust, it is unfortunate that the Court in the
former case dealt with a constitutional issue as though it differed in
kind from other questions involving matters of national concern. 66
Such treatment might be justified when the question is whether a
particular activity violates some command of the Constitution, but
certainly not when the question is whether there is a need for a remedy
to protect against admittedly unconstitutional actions.
Between Wolf and Mapp, the Court had decided several cases of
importance to the question of federal common law rules. In Wilburn
Boat v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,'" Mr. Justice Black, writing
for the Court, declined to formulate a federal rule governing the effect
on recovery of the breach of a provision in a maritime insurance con-
tract. Texas law provided that breach would bar recovery only where
it contributed to the loss, while the federal district court had found
the "literal performance rule" to be established in admiralty practice.
The Supreme Court did not agree that the literal performance
rule had been so established. The question for decision was whether
to accept divergent state rules or formulate a uniform rule on the
effect of breach. The Court found the difficulty of choosing among
the various state rules preclusive of a federal rule. Furthermore, it
saw no indication of a strong connection between the necessity of a
uniform rule and a significant national concern.
Congress has been exceedingly cautious about disturbing
this system, even as to maritime insurance where con-
36 367 U.S. at 651.
364338 U.S. at 40-41.
36 367 U.S. at 670.
366 But not so in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See id. at 21
(Black, J., concurring).
367 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
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gressional power is undoubted. We, like Congress, leave
the regulation of marine insurance where it has been-with
the States. 68
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, pointing out that the case before the court
involved "a houseboat yacht brought to Lake Texacoma for private
recreation," " was dubious even about the national concern in the case.
Bank of America v. Parnell 37o was a diversity action to recover
for the conversion of government bonds. The court of appeals had
agreed with Parnell's claim that Clearfield Trust compelled the appli-
cation of federal law to the whole case. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and
a majority of the Court, disagreed. The case, he noted, did not in-
volve the United States as a party, but was a strictly private trans-
action. Of course federal law controlled the obligations and rights
created by the paper. But on the question of burden of proof of good
faith, in a case of conversion involving private parties, Justice Frank-
furter could find no national concern requiring the application of a
federal rule.
The only possible interest of the United States in a situation
like the one here, exclusively involving the transfer of Govern-
ment paper between private persons, is that the floating of
securities of the United States might somehow or other be
adversely affected by the local rule of a particular State
regarding the liability of a converter. This is far too
speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the appli-
cation of federal law to transactions essentially of local
concern.
371
Justices Black and Douglas dissented on two points: the rights
created by government paper should not distinguish between public and
private parties to transactions. "If the rule of the Clearfield Trust case
is to be abandoned as to some parties, it should be abandoned as to all
and we should start afresh on this problem." 11 Second, the dissenters
disapproved of the uncertainty arising from a situation in which parts
of disputes are covered by federal, and others by state law. They found
the primary national concern in the "convenience, certainty, and def-
initeness in having one set of rules." "
368 Id. at 321; cf. Note, The Competewe of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules
of Decision, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 1084, 1090 (1964).
369 348 U.S. at 322.
370 352 U.S. 29 (1956). For a full analysis of this case see Mishkin, supra note
340, at 824.
371 352 U.S. at 33-34.
372 Id. at 35 (dissenting opinion).
378 Id.
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The highly significant Lincoln Mills 874 case was decided a few
months later. The majority opinion by Justice Douglas is consistent
with the views he had expressed in earlier cases. The grant of juris-
diction in section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, he said,
expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations
and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that
way
375
However, the statute itself made no reference to an applicable body of
substantive law or remedial incidents. Justice Douglas nevertheless
concluded that the purpose of the statute was "to provide necessary
legal remedies." '76
Some [problems] will lack express statutory sanction but will
be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and
fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem. 7
Furthermore, the substantive law to be applied "is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws." 3"
"It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where
federal rights are concerned." Justices Burton and Harlan, concur-
ring, agreed that the federal courts were "not powerless to fashion an
appropriate federal remedy." " But they did not agree that therefore
all substantive law subject to adjudication under section 301 would be
federal: "some federal rights may necessarily be involved in a
§ 301 case." "'
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the case is consistent with
my analysis. He did not find judicial legislation necessary in this
situation:
[T]he meaning of collective bargaining for labor does not
remotely derive from reliance on the sanction of litigation
in the courts.'
374 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). A full dis-
cussion of the intricate problems of federal jurisdiction raised in this case are beyond
the scope of my immediate concern with judicial creation of substantive and remedial
common law.
375353 U.S. at 455.
371SId.
877Id. at 457.37sId. at 456.
37 Id. at 457.
380 Id. at 460 (concurring opinion).
381 Id. (emphasis added).
M Id. at 462 (dissenting opinion).
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Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter felt that the specific national concern
here was far too vague to require judicially created protection:
There are severe limits on "judicial inventiveness" even for
the most imaginative judges. The law is not a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky," . . . , and it cannot be drawn
from there like nitrogen from the air.m
The essence of Justice Frankfurter's position here is not that there was
an absence of judicial power, but a call for sound management of that
power. He was less inclined than the majority to find a national con-
cern that would require the fashioning of federal law, and more re-
luctant to be protective of a national concern where Congress had not
given some indication of its nature and significance.
These cases serve as background for the mystifying s majority
opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas in Wheeldin v. Wheeler. 5 The peti-
tioner there had been served with a subpoena to appear before the
House Un-American Activities Committee. His name had been
inserted on a blank subpoena, allegedly without authorization, by the
Committee investigator. The complaint also alleged malicious motives
on the part of the investigator, as well as the unconstitutionality of the
congressional resolution authorizing the Committee to act and sub-
poena witnesses . 6  The district court had denied injunctive relief
on the ground that "mere apprehension that a federal right might be
infringed at some future time did not warrant declaratory or injunctive
relief at the present time." 3s7 The petitioner's appearance before the
Committee did not seem likely.
On the authority of Bell v. Hood 8 and Bock v. Perkins,
38'
Justice Douglas held that the complaint stated sufficient claims to
warrant federal jurisdiction. He denied the existence of any con-
stitutional issue in the case on the ground that no violation of the
fourth amendment appeared from the facts. However, the petitioner
had argued that the failure of the investigator to comply with the
statute authorizing subpoenas gave rise to a cause of action in damages.
Justice Douglas' response was extraordinary:
As respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law
rights, it is perhaps needless to state that we are not in the
83 Id. at 465.
384Cf. Friendly, supra note 28, at 105 n.142: "Curiously the opinion was by Mr.
Justice Douglas, the leader in the development of 'federal common law.'"
385 373 U.S. 647 (1963). The counsel who handled the Bell case were attorneys
for the plaintiff here as well.
386 Cf. Stamler v. Willis, 371 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1966).
387 373 U.S. at 648-49. The court of appeals dismissed the claim for injunctive
relief as moot 280 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1960).
388 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
389139 U.S. 628 (1891).
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free-wheeling days ante-dating Erie. . . The instances
where we have created federal common law are few and
restricted.3 90
Clearfield Trust was explained on the basis of the need for "a
uniform rule in that area." 39' "But even that rule was qualified in
.Parnell." 392 Citation to Holmberg, Justice Douglas said, was
"singularly inapposite." That case "was a suit to enforce a liability
created by a federal statute, and the question was what remedies the
federal courts should apply." "' This effort to distinguish Holmberg is
intelligible only on the basis of Justice Douglas' reading of the subpoena
statute as one "which only grants [a] power." " He does not explain
how this distinguishes the statute in question from the "power" of the
federal officers in Land v. Dollar, where he had said: "But public
officers may become tortfeasors by exceeding the limits of their au-
thority." "' Perhaps there is only the difference that the action here is
"usually governed by local law" with federal law supplying a defense.3 96
Lincoln Mills was distinguished on the ground that Congress had there
(but not here) "left to federal courts the creation of a federal common
law for abuse of process." 197 "Congress could, of course, provide
otherwise, but it has not done so." "s What had Congress done in
Lincoln Mills that it did not do here? It had simply given the federal
courts jurisdiction that would not have otherwise existed. In
Wheeldin such action was not necessary-jurisdiction already existed
under the authority of Bell v. Hood.
Justice Douglas did not defer to Congress in Mapp; rather, he
was more than willing to note the factual necessity of providing a
remedy for "those upon whose person or premises something incrim-
inating has been found." "I Granted that there was no constitutional
issue in Wheeldin, the only remedy available was a state action for
abuse of process-the very kind of remedy that Justice Douglas had
found to leave the fourth amendment a "dead letter." 400
390 373 U.S. at 651. But see text accompanying note 379 supra.
391 373 U.S. at 651.
392 Id.
393 Id. at 651 n.5.
894 Id. at 651. See text accompanying notes 205-09 supra.
395 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947) ; see note 271 supra.
396 373 U.S. at 652. But cf. Friendly, supra note 28, at 85: "I am not at all sure
that what the majority considered obvious distinctions between the plaintiff's right and
the defendant's defense or between acts within and without the perimeter [of the
officer's line of duty] will prove viable."
397 373 U.S. at 652. But cf. Mishkin, The Federal "Questioe" in the District
Courts, 53 CoLum. L. REV. 157, 165 (1953).
398 373 U.S. at 652.
399 See text accompanying note 356 supra.
400 Id. at 670.
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But the most discouraging aspect of the case is its tautology: the
argument purports to demonstrate the exclusiveness of state law on
the facts alleged because the action if brought in a state court would
be removable under section 1442(a) (1).401 If that is true, the de-
cision of the Supreme Court in Bell is either not understood or seriously
questioned. If the allegations in Wheeldin were sufficient to confer
original jurisdiction, and Justice Douglas said they were,40 2 removal
would be possible under section 1441 40 as well. That the case is
removable under section 1442(a) (1) is in no way an argument
against the necessity of a federal cause of action. If relevant at all, the
removal provision is indicative of a sufficient national concern to
permit all such cases to be heard in a federal forum. The national
concern manifested by removal statutes is of course directed toward
defendants.0 4 But it was Justice Douglas himself who said that when
federal officers act unlawfully, "[t] he dominant interest of the sovereign
is then on the side of the victim." " In Wheeldin, for the first time
in over twenty years, Justice Douglas was moved to conclude "it is
not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area." 406
The Court could hardly have failed to see that the national concern
with the activities of federal officers is not different in kind from that
involved in the "activities" of federal commercial paper. The decision
can only be explained as a failure to appreciate the necessity for a
federal remedy-a necessity grasped in Wolf, Mapp, Lincoln Mills,
Parnell, Tunstall and Clearfield Trust.40 7
The problem of determining necessity is not a simple one. On
the other hand, it must be admitted that whether or not a federal
40128 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) (1964).
That state law governs the cause of action alleged is shown by the fact
that removal is possible in a nondiversity case such as this one only because
the interpretation of a federal defense makes the case one "arising under"
the Constitution or laws of the United States.
373 U.S. at 652.
402 373 U.S. at 649.
403 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
404 Cf. Wechsler, supra note 233, at 233-34.
405 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947).
406 373 U.S. at 652.
407 Wheeldin remains the only case in which Justice Douglas took a position
against the creation of a federal common law. See United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341, 359 (1966). Ironically, it is also the only such case involving what might be
called a question of civil liberties. Twelve months after Wheeldin, he was to write:
"The duty of common carriers to carry all regardless of race, creed or color was in
part the product of the inventive genius of judges. . . . We should make that body
of law the common law of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments so to speak.
Restaurants in the modern setting are as essential to travelers as inns and carriers."
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964). See also his dissenting opinion in
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 558 (1967).
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remedy should be created raises much less serious and difficult prob-
lems than the creation of rules defining primary duties."' The question
of necessity should depend on the relevance of uniformity," 9 the extent
to which a federal rule would undermine a state interest or policy,410
the extent to which a body of federal regulations already has had sig-
nificant impact on the area in question,41' whether or not the entity
relations of the United States are involved,' the extent to which the
question may be resolved by reference to state law, and the adequacy
of that resolution in light of any federal concern.4 3
No evidence of the need for a damage remedy to protect against
abuses of federal power which invade constitutionally defined interests
is more persuasive than the arguments of the Justices themselves.
Within the last fifteen years, seven members of the Court have spoken
on the inadequacy of existing state tort law for the protection of
constitutional interests.4' 4 Justice Harlan, concurring in Monroe v.
Pape, pointed up the problem:
There will be many cases in which the relief provided by the
state to the victim of a use of state power which the state
either did not or could not constitutionally authorize will be
far less than what Congress may have thought would be fair
reimbursement for deprivation of a constitutional right. I
would venture only a few examples. There may be no dam-
age remedy for the loss of voting rights or for the harm from
psychological coercion leading to a confession. And what
is the dollar value of the right to go to unsegregated schools?
Even the remedy for such an unauthorized search and seizure
as Monroe was allegedly subjected to may be only the nominal
amount of damages to physical property allowable in an
action for trespass to land. It would indeed be the purest
coincidence if the state remedies for violation of common law
rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress
those injuries which only a state official can cause and
against which the Constitution provides protection.4' 5
4 0 8 See H. M. HART & A. SACHS, spra note 204. For other examples of the em-
ployment of a federal common law, see Kurland, The Ro-mero Case and Some Problems
of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HAxv. L. REv. 817, 828 (1960).4 09 See Hart, supra note 297, at 535.410 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
411 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).412 See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
413 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1947). See also the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 45 (1967).
414 See text accompanying note 359 rmpra.
415 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961). Cf. Foote, supra note 274. See also Sax &
Hiestand, supra note 102, where the authors overlook the significance of cases like
Bell v. Hood and Wheeldin v. Wheeler: "Of course, recovery in cases of the sort men-
tioned above ordinarily turns upon a statute granting a right to substantial civil
damages, but, for our purposes, it is irrelevant whether the source of the right is in a
statute or in the common law, as the identical results in the American (statutory) and
English (common law) voting rights cases demonstrate." 65 MicH. L. Rsv. at 880.
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Unfortunately it is not true that only state officials can cause such
injuries-federal officials can also. Monroe was just lucky: had Pape
been a federal officer he would have recovered nothing.
Finally, in Wheeldin v. Wheeler itself, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Black and Chief Justice Warren, dissented from the majority
opinion.
If this provision be interpreted to prohibit respondent from
issuing the Committee's subpoenas on his own, may a right
of action in damages be implied in favor of one injured as a
direct consequence of respondent's unlawful use of such a
subpoena? I see no reason why not. "Implied rights of
action are not contingent upon statutory language which
affirmatively indicates that they are intended. On the con-
trary, they are implied unless the legislation evidences a
contrary intention." 416
"[A]ctions against federal officials . . . are necessarily of
federal concern." Wechsler, [Federal Jurisdiction and the
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob.
216, 220 (1948)]. This is not to say that federal law is
necessarily implicated whenever the defendant is a federal
officer. . . . But where, as here, it is alleged that a federal
officer acting under color of federal law has so abused his
federal powers as to cause unjustifiable injury to a private
person, I see no warrant for concluding that state law must be
looked to as the sole basis for liability. Under such circum-
stances, no state interest is infringed by a generous con-
struction of federal jurisdiction, and every consideration of
practicality and justice argues for such a construction.
417
Little can be added to the force of these words. Yet how much stronger
the case when the injury to the private person is of constitutional
import. Nevertheless, a citizen abused by federal officers will find
that the Constitution, which once protected only against federal and
not state action, 8 now only protects against state and not against
federal action. I cannot but be reminded of the significant words of
de Tocqueville:
It must not be forgotten that it is especially dangerous to
enslave men in the minor details of life. For my own part,
I should be inclined to think freedom less necessary in great
things than in little ones, if it were possible to be secure of
the one without possessing the other. Subjection in minor
affairs breaks out every day, and is felt by the whole com-
416 373 U.S. at 661, quoting Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 224 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
417 373 U.S. at 664.
418 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-52 (1875).
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munity indiscriminately. It does not drive men to resistance,
but it crosses them at every turn, till they are led to surrender
the exercise of their will. Thus their spirit is gradually
broken and their character enervated; whereas that obedience,
which is exacted on a few important but rare occasions, only
exhibits servitude at certain intervals, and throws the burden
of it upon a smaller number of men. It is vain to summon
a people, which has been rendered so dependent on the central
power, to choose from time to time the representatives of that
power; this rare and brief exercise of their free choice, how-
ever important it may be, will not prevent them from grad-
ually losing the faculties of thinking, feeling, and acting for
themselves and thus gradually falling below the level of
humanity.4 1
419 2 A. DE ToQUEVuLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334-35 (rev. ed. 1951).
